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INTRODUCTION
Though known among Evidence scholars, Stephens v. Miller is not a
ground-breaking case.' In applying a rape shield law to the "she said, he
said" facts before it-she said her acquaintance attempted to rape her, he
said they had consensual sex-and in wrestling with whether the application
of the rape shield deprived the defendant of his constitutional right to present
a defense, the Seventh Circuit en banc opinion forged no new law. Instead,
the plurality engaged in a rather straightforward, even predictable, analysis.
The opinion's references to "doggy fashion" 2 sex may give the case some
singularity. But as far as cases go, Stephens v. Miller is not canonical. One
could even say the case is non-exceptional, at least insofar as any sexual
assault case can be described as non-exceptional.
Copyright @ 2016 by 1. Bennett Capers
tStanley A. August Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School. BA Princeton Univer-
sity; JD Columbia Law School. Assistant U.S. Attorney, Southern District of New York,
1995-2004. E-mail: bennett.capers@brooklaw.edu. This Article benefited from presenta-
tion at the "Rape" panel at the Association of American Law Schools' 2016 Annual
Meeting, and from presentation at a faculty workshop at Drexel Law School. This article
also benefited from conversations and feedback from numerous individuals: Michelle
Anderson, Anne Coughlin, George Fisher, Lisa Kern Griffin, Aya Gruber, Craig Kon-
noth, Julia Simon-Kerr, Alice Ristroph, and Deborah Tuerkheimer. To them, I am in-
debted as well. Finally, an extra special thanks to my research librarian Kathleen Darvil.
' Stephens v. Miller, 13 F.3d 998 (7th Cir. 1994) (en banc), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct.
57 (1994). The case does appear in a few Evidence law casebooks. See, e.g., GEORGE
FiSHER, EVIDENCE 347-53 (3rd ed. 2014). The case has also been the subject of a few law
review articles and notes. See, e.g., John Lausch, Note, Stephens v. Miller: The Need to
Shield Rape Victims, Defend Accused Offenders, and Define a Workable Constitutional
Standard, 90 Nw. U. L. REV. 346 (1995); Richard W. Miller III, Note, Stephens v. Miller:
Placing Rape Shield Statutes Between a Rock and a Hard Place, 27 U. ToL. L. REV. 217
(1995).
2 Stephens, 13 F.3d at 1000.
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It is its very non-exceptionalism, however, that makes Stephens v.
Miller an interesting case and ultimately a curious one. Allow me to begin
with interesting. Part of what draws me to Stephens v. Miller is my interest
in storytelling and the law, specifically the stories we tell with respect to
rape. We are still, for the most part, stuck at "he said, she said" for the
typical acquaintance rape,' or "he said, he said" for the less typical ones. 4
We listen to stories, usually competing stories, and try to ascertain truth be-
yond a reasonable doubt.' This observation alone is not new. Competing
narratives in rape trials is well-trodden ground.' Stephens v. Miller, with its
multiple judicial opinions, illustrates a different aspect of storytelling in rape
trials that is worthy of closer scrutiny: the stories courts tell. It poses a new
question: if court opinions are "never innocent,"' if courts are not above
shading the truth, then how can we expect more of complainants and defend-
ants? Separate and apart from the role courts play in the stories we tell,
Stephens v. Miller serves as a sobering reminder not only of what Robert
Cover called law's violence'-the law, let us not forget, sentences Stephens
to twenty years' imprisonment-but also of law's impotence. Notwithstand-
ing numerous rape reforms liberalizing rape law,9 when it comes to rape
judgments and ascertaining, with epistemic comfort, whether a rape oc-
There are rarely third-party witnesses to sexual assault offenses. A recent study
found that third-party witnesses exist in fewer than 22% of rape cases. See JOSEPH PETER-
SON ET AL., THE ROLE AND IMPACT OF FORENSIC EVIDENCE IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE
PROCESS 92 (2010).
' This Article focuses primarily on female victim rape because most of the cases
applying rape shields involve male defendants and female victims. This is not because
male-on-male rape does not happen. As I have demonstrated elsewhere, once we include
prison populations, the frequency of male victim rape rivals female victim rape. See I.
Bennett Capers, Real Rape Too, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 1259, 1266-77 (2011).
I This of course assumes that the goal of criminal trials is truth, a goal which the
Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized. See, e.g., United States v. Havens, 446 U.S.
620, 626 (1980) (stressing the importance of "arriving at the truth in criminal trials");
Tehan v. United States, 382 U.S. 406, 416 (1966) ("The basic purpose of a trial is the
determination of truth."). However, given that courts routinely exclude truth-aiding infor-
mation in order to serve some other goal-for example, protection from involuntary con-
fessions-it may be more accurate to speak in terms of "legal truth." For a cogent
argument that we are not interested in even legal truth, but rather the appearance of legal
truth, see Edson R. Sunderland, Verdicts, General and Special, 29 YALE L.J. 253, 261-62
(1920).
6 See, e.g., ANDREW E. TASLITz, RAPE AND THE CULTURE OF THE COURTROOM 37-41
(1999); see also Corey Rayburn, To Catch a Sex Thief: The Burden of Performance in
Rape and Sexual Assault Trials, 15 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 437, 437-41 (2006); Ann
Althouse, Thelma and Louise and the Law: Do Rape Shield Rules Matter?, 25 Lov. L.A.
L. REV. 757, 767-72 (1992).
Peter Brooks, The Law as Narrative and Rhetoric, in LAW'S STORIES: NARRATIVE
AND RHETORIC IN THE LAW 16,16 (Peter Brooks & Paul Gewirtz eds., 1996).
Robert Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE L.J. 1601, 1601 (1986) ("Legal
interpretive acts signal and occasion the imposition of violence upon others.").
9 For an overview of such reforms, see Richard Klein, An Analysis of Thirty-Five
Years of Rape Reform: A Frustrating Search for Fundamental Fairness, 41 AKRON L.
REV. 981 (2008) (arguing that recent reforms in rape law have weakened accused rapists'
due process rights).
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curred, we are often no better off than we were before such reforms were
enacted.' 0 Again, we are stuck at stories.
This is only part of what makes Stephens v. Miller interesting. I men-
tioned that the plurality engaged in a rather straightforward application of
the rape shield rule. Faced with a choice between the law is and the law
ought, the plurality chose the former. But the law ought was not completely
silenced. There is a reason why the en banc opinion includes a total of seven
opinions-four judges in the plurality, two concurring opinions, and five
judges issuing four dissenting opinions. The tension between the law is and
the law ought is particularly evident with rape shields. Nearly five decades
after the widespread adoption of rape shield rules-every state now has
some version of a rape shield barring from trial evidence of the sexual his-
tory of the complainant"-the application of rape shield rules continues to
be problematic, unsatisfying, fraught, and out of touch with what many
would consider to be the right judgments.1 2 Stephens v. Miller, with its mul-
tiple en banc opinions, to say nothing of its multiple lower court opinions,
illustrates just how problematic rape shields continue to be. The opinion
should also prompt us to take note of an odd state of affairs: notwithstanding
nearly perennial reforms to the substance of rape law-including recent re-
forms to criminalize non-forcible rape, to cover rape by fraud and exploita-
tion, to require affirmative consent-the evidentiary rules around rape have
remained oddly stagnant. We are still relying on rape shield rules that were
drafted in the 1970s, that predate even the societal awareness of acquain-
tance rape, 3 that have little to do with evolving cultural norms around sex.14
All of this makes Stephens v. Miller interesting. Ultimately, however,
what makes Stephens v. Miller especially interesting to me is what the deci-
sion could have done. For me, Stephens v. Miller signals a missed opportu-
nity, one that could have addressed two of the most intractable problems
with rape shields: the sense that they are often over-inclusive and our intui-
tive sense that sometimes they get in the way of the right rape judgment. To
be clear, by "right judgment," I am not necessarily referring to a particular
verdict. Rather, I mean a judgment-whether guilty or not guilty-that re-
stores to juries the right to decide crucial facts and gives us comfort that the
fact-finders' decision was based on the necessary evidence. Just underneath
the surface of Stephens v. Miller is a solution to both of these problems.
Indeed, the solution is one that the evidentiary issue in Stephens v. Miller-
the admissibility of a question and a statement, mere words: "Don't you like
0 Indeed, with the recognition of acquaintance rape and non-forcible rape, we face
additional hurdles in getting at the truth, since now there may be little tangible evidence
of whether a rape in fact took place.
" For a list of state statutes, see 1 WHARTON'S CRIMINAL EVIDENCE § 4.41 n.39 (15th
ed. 2015).
12 See infra notes 152-204 and accompanying text.
' See infra notes 208-11 and accompanying text.
14 For a discussion of some of these evolving norms, see I. Bennett Capers, Real
Women, Real Rape, 60 UCLA L. REV. 826, 876-79 (2013).
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it like this? . . . Tim Hall said you did"-seemed to invite, and yet it went
unnoticed by the plurality." The solution involves borrowing from another
branch of evidence law: hearsay. The solution involves re-conceptualizing
rape shield laws to consider whether sexual history evidence is being offered
for its truth, or for some non-truth purpose. As I shall demonstrate, this solu-
tion is remarkably simple. The significance of the solution is not its simplic-
ity, however. The mark of the solution is that it can result in better rape
judgments not only in cases like Stephens v. Miller but in an array of other
rape cases as well, including a particularly challenging category of cases-
cases in which the defendant claims that he made an honest but reasonable
mistake as to whether consent existed.' 6
This Article begins proper, in Part I, by examining the facts, both elic-
ited and not elicited, during the trial of Lonnie Stephens and the resulting
Seventh Circuit en banc decision. After exploring the role narrative plays for
jurors and other decision-makers, Part H then calls "the story" of Stephens
v. Miller into question by showing that there is not just one story, but sev-
eral, including those that various courts participated in constructing. Of
course, it is the plurality's official story that informs the plurality's rape
shield analysis. Part HI accordingly turns to this analysis and to the many
problems with rape shield rules in general. Rape shield rules, progressive as
they were in the late 1970s when they were first introduced, are in need of
reform. Looking beneath the surface of Stephens v. Miller to reveal a simple
solution, Part IV begins the process of doing just that.
I. THE CASE
A. The Trial
On the night of March 17, 1987, the woman in this case-let's call her
"the woman"1 7-was in the front room of her trailer sleeping." She hadn't
"Stephens v. Miller, 13 F.3d 998, 1010 (7th Cir. 1994) (en banc).
16 Although jurisdictions vary on the mens rea required for rape or sexual assault-or
use mens rea as a way to grade sexual assault offenses-the general rule has been that a
person is not guilty of rape if he honestly and reasonably believed that consent to sexual
intercourse was present. Reasonable mistake is not an affirmative defense per se, but
rather an element-negating defense, since the defendant is claiming that he lacked the
requisite mens rea to be guilty of the charged offense. For more on reasonable mistakes
and sexual assault, see Joshua Dressler, Where We Have Been, and Where We Might Be
Going: Some Cautionary Reflections on Rape Law Reform, 46 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 409,
431 (1998); Rosanna Cavallaro, A Big Mistake: Eroding the Defense of Mistake of Fact
About Consent in Rape, 86 J. CIm. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 815, 817-42 (1996).
1 Calling her "the woman" deserves explanation. Historically, of course, we shied
away from naming rape accusers and victims-calling them instead the complainant, the
accuser, the prosecutrix, indeed anything but their real names. Whether withheld as a
matter of courtesy, or law, or court orders, this has been and continues to be the norm.
See generally, Deborah W. Denno, Perspectives on Disclosing Rape Victims' Names, 61
FORDHAM L. REv. 1113, 1113 (1993) (noting that the "great majority" of news organiza-
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locked the front door and awoke to find Lonnie Stephens standing near her.19
She knew Lonnie Stephens; they were casual acquaintances, so to speak.2 0
He sat down next to her on the couch and attempted to kiss her.21 She told
Stephens that her sister and brother-in-law were asleep in the bedroom,
which was true.22 Her son and nephew were also in the trailer someplace. 23
She yelled for her sister, and Stephens stopped for a bit but then persisted
with his advances. 24 The woman again called for her sister; again her sister
failed to respond. 25 At this point, Stephens got up and went to the bathroom,
leaving the woman alone. 26 When Stephens returned, he angrily accused the
woman of lying about her 'sister and brother-in-law being in the trailer. 27
Stephens threw the woman on the couch and covered her mouth to keep her
from screaming, then pressed his body against her, unfastened her bra, and
reached down to undo his pants. 28 It was as he was undoing his pants that the
woman pushed him away and ran into the bedroom shouting.29 Perhaps real-
izing that there were in fact other people in the trailer, Stephens fled.30
But already, this telling is incomplete, since Stephens's version of
events, as is often the case in the "he said, she said" narrative of rape cases,
is, decidedly different. According to Stephens, earlier that evening, he had
gone out for drinks with his friend David Stone.3 1 Afterwards, he asked
Stone to drop him off at the woman's trailer.3 2 The woman's son was sleeping
on the couch. Stephens moved him to a bedroom, where, as the woman
explained, her sister, brother-in-law, and their child were also sleeping.33
With the living room to themselves, Stephens and the woman talked. The
tions today do not disclose the names of rape victims). But as is typical when it comes to
rape and sexual assault, every decision comes at a cost. Although withholding names may
encourage victims to come forward and report rape, it also perpetuates our unfortunate
history of equating a woman's value with her chastity and viewing rape victims as dam-
aged goods. While all of this weighed in my thinking, ultimately my decision to call her
"the woman" has a more strategic explanation. By calling her "the woman," I hope to
convey that she could be any woman. Given that one in five women have been victimized
by rape and that all women are at risk of rape, "the woman" in this case really could be
any woman. MICHELLE C. BLACK ET AL., THE NATIONAL INTIMATE PARTNER AND SEXUAL
VIOLENCE SURVEY: 2011 SUMMARY REPORT (2011), http://www.cdc.gov/violencepreven-
tion/pdf/nisvs executive summary-a.pdf [http://perma.ccIF4TS-QEJ6].
" Stephens, 13 F.3d at 1000.
9 Id.
20 Id.
21 Id.
22 Id.
23 Id.
24 Id.
25 Id.
26 Id.
27 Id.28 Id.
29 Id.
30 Id.
3' Id.
32 Stephens v. Miller, 989 F.2d 264, 266 (7th Cir. 1993).
" Stephens v. Miller, 13 F.3d 998, 1000 (7th Cir. 1993) (en banc).
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woman gave Stephens permission to kiss her,34 they engaged in foreplay, 5
and, well, "one thing led to another," with the two of them on the floor
"doing it doggy fashion."3 6 It was as they were "doing it doggy fashion"
that Stephens said to the woman, "[D]on't you like it like this? .... Tim
Hall said you did."" Stephens also suggested perhaps "switching partners"
at some future time, since he had heard from Tim Hall that she enjoyed
partner switching.38 According to Stephens, his statements resulted in coitus
interruptus, though he did not use that term. 39 The woman angrily told him to
stop and leave. 40 Stephens did as he was told.41 In short, per Stephens, every-
thing was going fine until he spoke about Tim Hall and switching partners.42
It was this that angered the woman and led her to fabricate the attempted
rape charge.
Of some import too are the events that followed. After Stephens left the
woman's home, he went to his friends' home nearby and told them he had
just come from the local Pic a Pac Store. 43 When questioned by the police
about the alleged attempted sexual assault, he stuck with his story about the
Pic a Pac store." As further cover, Stephens asked his friend David Stone to
tell the police that after the two of them had gone drinking, Stone had
dropped him off at the store. 45 Stone agreed, and even testified at trial that he
had driven Stephens to the Pic a Pac.46 On cross-examination, however,
Stone admitted that he had told the Pic a Pac story due to instructions from
Stephens.47
3 Id.
" Stephens, 989 F.2d at 266.
6 Stephens, 13 F.3d 998 at 1000.
3 Id.
* Id. Apparently, this was in reference to his conversations with Tim Hall, from
which Stephens understood that the woman had engaged in partner switching before with
Tim and his wife. See Stephens v. State, 544 N.E.2d 137, 138-39 (Ind. 1989).
" See 13 F.3d at 1000.
4 Id. at 1001.
41 Id.
42 In fact, on a list of ten things not to say as "dirty talk" during sex, Stephens's
comments evoked at least two enumerated don'ts. See Maggie Parker, Ten Dirty Talk Dos
and Don'ts, MENSFITNESS.COM, http://www.mensfitness.com/women/sex-tips/10-dirty-
talking-dos-and-donts [http://perma.ccl7Q5D-JJAY] (listing as number one using deroga-
tory terms like "slut" and listing as number seven "don't be demeaning"). As evidence of
how complicated sexual relations can be, the same list encourages men to be dominating.
Id. Another site notes that some women are turned on by terms like "slut" and "whore"
during sex, even though they would find the terms offensive outside of sex. See Lizette
Borelli, The Science of Dirty Talk and Why it Increases Sexual Pleasure, MEDICALDAILY
.com (Apr. 27, 2015, 8:00 AM), http://www.medicaldaily.com/science-dirty-talk-and-
why-it-increases-sexual-pleasure-349854 [https://perma.cc/72GC-C6DB].
43 Stephens v. Miller, 13 F.3d at 1000.
4 Id.
45 Id.
4 Id.
47 Id. Stephens also gave four different versions of the event to his live-in girlfriend,
but claimed he did so because he was afraid she would leave him and take their children.
Stephens v. Morris, 756 F. Supp. 1137, 1141 (N.D. Ind. 1991).
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The jury that sat on Stephens's attempted rape trial heard most of the
foregoing evidence, but not all. In this case of "she said, he said," the jury
only heard part of what Stephens said. Pursuant to Indiana's Rape Shield
Statute,48 which, like most rape shield laws, generally excludes evidence of a
complainant's prior sexual history or conduct, the trial court ruled that the
defendant's proffered testimony about what he said to the woman during
sex-"[D]on't you like it like this? ... Tim Hall said you did."-was inad-
missible since his statements referenced the woman's sexual history.49 For
the same reason, the trial court also precluded Stephens from repeating his
comments about "doing it doggy fashion" or "switching partners." 0 In re-
sponse to Stephens's contention that he was being denied his constitutional
right to testify in his own defense and to support his theory of the case-that
Stephens's words sufficiently angered the woman enough to prompt her to
falsely claim rape-the trial offered a take it or leave it alternative. The trial
court allowed Stephens to testify that he had said "something" to the woman
that angered her and led her to fabricate an attempted rape charge." With his
options so circumscribed, Stephens testified that he made unspecified state-
ments that angered the woman, and she ordered him to stop and leave, which
he did.5 2
Given this limitation, this snipping of Stephens's testimony, it is per-
haps not surprising that the jury found him to be the less credible party and
returned a verdict of guilty,53 as a result of which the trial court sentenced
Stephens to twenty years' incarceration. We tend to associate specificity and
details with credibility,M and lack of details with deceit." As such, Ste-
phens's vague statement that he said "something" likely rendered his entire
testimony suspect in the minds of the jurors. It was certainly at odds with the
48 IND. CODE § 35-37-4-4 (2016). The Indiana Rape Shield Statute bars evidence of a
victim's past sexual conduct. However, such evidence may be admitted if such evidence:
(1) shows the witness' past sexual conduct with the defendant; (2) shows a specific in-
stance of sexual activity which would show some person other than the defendant com-
mitted the act in question; or (3) shows that the victim's pregnancy at the time of trial was
not caused by the defendant. Id. § 35-374-4(b).
49 Stephens v. Miller, 13 F.3d at 1000.
50 Id.
5 Id. at 1001.
52 Id.
53 Id.
54 Steven Lubet, Persuasion at Trial, 21 AM. J. TkiAL ADVoc. 325, 341 (1997) ("In
many recent psychological studies, two traits stand out as well-accepted indicators of
believability. All things being equal, a factfinder is more likely to believe a witness who
exhibits certainty and mastery of detail."). It is no coincidence that courts demand speci-
ficity in the Fourth Amendment context of ascertaining probable cause. See, e.g., Illinois
v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 233-34 (1983) (discussing how a "detailed description" can tip
the scales).
5 Cynthia R. Cohen et al., Demeanor, Deception and Credibility in Witnesses, Pres-
entation Paper at American Bar Association Section of Litigation Annual Conference 13,
(Apr. 24-26, 2013), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/abaladministrativelliti
gation/materials/sac2013/sac_2013/33_demeanor-deception.authcheckdam.pdf [https://
perma.cc/8V2M-M9QD] ("Liars are not always vivid with details.").
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importance of telling a story "with descriptive richness," and the "persua-
sive power of the concrete and particular," that the Court espoused in per-
haps the most famous Supreme Court evidence case, Old Chief v. United
States.56
It was the trial court's decision to exclude Stephens's actual statements
that became the focus of Stephens's appeal, first in Indiana state courts, and
then in federal court pursuant to his habeas petitions.
B. The Appeals
Although there were a range of appeals-directly to the Indiana Su-
preme Court,57 then to a federal district court on habeas," and then to the
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals twice"-it is the Seventh Circuit plurality
opinion upon rehearing en banc that is the most interesting, both for what it
says and what it does not.
Stephens's argument before the en banc court was simple: the trial
court's application of Indiana's Rape Shield Statute in effect deprived him of
his constitutional right to testify in his own defense.? In addition, Stephens
argued that the excluded evidence should have been admissible because it
was part of the res gestae of the offense.61 In a 6-5 decision, the Seventh
Circuit affirmed Stephens's conviction. The plurality decision acknowledged
that the Supreme Court has long interpreted the Sixth Amendment as guar-
antying a criminal defendant a right to testify in his or her own defense but
noted that this right "is not unlimited and may bow to accommodate other
legitimate interests in the criminal process." 62 For example, although a de-
fendant has the right to testify, he does not have the right to commit per-
jury,63 and procedural and evidentiary rules may "control the presentation of
56 Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 187-188 (1997). As the Court empha-
sized in Old Chief, the "persuasive power of the concrete and particular is often essential
to the capacity of jurors to satisfy the obligations that the law places on them." Id. at 187.
The Court added, "A party seemingly responsible for cloaking something has reason for
apprehension." Id. at 189. Stephen Saltzburg makes a similar point: "If [jurors'] expecta-
tions are not satisfied, triers of fact may penalize the party who disappointed them by
drawing a negative inference against that party." Stephen A. Saltzburg, A Special Aspect
of Relevance: Countering Negative Inferences Associated with the Absence of Evidence,
66 CALIF. L. REv. 1011, 1019 (1978).
Stephens v. State, 544 N.E.2d 137 (Ind. 1989).
5 Stephens v. Morris, 756 F. Supp. 1137 (N.D. Ind. 1991) (denying habeas petition).
' Stephens v. Miller, 989 F.2d 264 (7th Cir. 1994) and Stephens v. Miller, 13 F.3d
998 (7th Cir. 1994) (en banc).
' Stephens v. Miller, 13 F.3d at 1001.
61 Id. at 1003. At common law, res gestae, quite literally the "things done," allowed
parties to introduce evidence of matters inextricably linked to the main fact, and was
occasionally invoked to permit the introduction of statements that were trustworthy. At
the time Stephens v. Miller was decided, Indiana law specifically permitted res gestae
evidence of events "happening near in time and place which complete the story of the
crime." Id.
62 Id. at 1002 (quoting Michigan v. Lucas, 500 U.S. 145 (1991)).
63 Id. at 1002 (citing United States v. Dunnigan, 507 U.S. 87, 96 (1993).
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evidence" without "offend[ing] a criminal defendant's right to testify.""
Rape shield rules fall into this category, the majority held.
Rape shield statutes ... represent the valid legislative determina-
tion that victims of rape and, as here, attempted rape deserve
heightened protection against surprise, harassment, and unneces-
sary invasions of privacy. These statutes also protect against sur-
prise to the prosecution. Restrictions imposed by rape shield
statutes, especially as they relate to a criminal defendant's right to
testify, may not, however, be arbitrary or disproportionate to the
purposes they are designed to serve. Rather, the state is required to
evaluate whether the interests served by the rule justify the limita-
tion imposed on the criminal defendant's right to testify.65
Categorizing the trial court's decision to circumscribe Stephens's ver-
sion of events as a "very minor imposition on Stephens' right to testify," the
plurality concluded that this minor limitation was easily justified.66 The trial
court "properly balanced Stephens' right to testify with Indiana's interests
because it allowed him to testify about what happened and that he said
something that upset [the complainant]." 67
The plurality also quickly rejected Stephens's res gestae claim, finding
that permitting all evidence of "the thing done" did not rise to the level of a
constitutional requirement.68 The plurality noted a practical, Pandora's box
problem with Stephens's res gestae claim: to permit it would essentially
render rape shields a dead letter, since a criminal defendant could always
claim they heard or said something near in time and place to the alleged
sexual assault to invoke res gestae and sidestep rape shield laws. 6 9
Four separate dissents were filed. The thrust, however, was similar.
While the dissenters conceded that the interests served by rape shield stat-
utes are substantial, they emphasized that those interests must occasionally
yield in certain cases to the accused's right to present a defense. Such was
the case here, where the plausibility of Stephens's defense "turned in sub-
stantial part on whether the jury could be persuaded that something Stephens
had said to the complainant could have so enraged her that she would have
responded" by fabricating an attempted rape. 0
Central to Stephens' case then are the words he claims to have said
that night, words the jury never heard. . . . Stephens instead was
permitted only to testify without elaboration that he had said some-
Id. (citing Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 55 n.11 (1987) and Chambers v. Missis-
sippi, 410 U.S. 284, 302 (1973)).
65 Id.
6 Id.
67 Id.
68 Id. at 1003.
69 Id.
7o Id. at 1010 (Cummings, J., dissenting).
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thing that angered the complainant. The judge required Stephens to
convince the jury of the truth of his story without allowing him to
reveal the fragments on which its plausibility turned. He was asked
to counter the detailed and vivid depiction offered by the prosecu-
tion with a version whose essential elements had been expunged.7'
In short, the dissent argued that this was a unique case where a defen-
dant's specific statements were "central to his defense," and therefore
should have been admitted. The dissent concluded, "Sending the innocent to
jail, or depriving the guilty of due process, is not a price our Constitution
allows us to pay for the legitimate and worthy ambition to protect those
already victimized from additional suffering. "72
II. THE STORIES WE TELL
In recent years, scholars have increasingly called attention to the critical
role narrative plays for jurors and other decision-makers. 73 While it has long
been the general view that such factfinders base their decisions on deductive
reasoning and probabilistic assessments, 74 this view is grounded more in as-
piration than reality. Experiential research makes clear that factfinders only
partially weigh probabilities when deciding cases.75 Even more critical to
factfinders is whether the provided evidence "can be assembled into a plau-
sible, teleological narrative."7 6 Andrew Taslitz, in his discussion of narrative,
makes a similar observation:
71 Id.
72 Id.
" See, e.g., Lisa Kern Griffin, Narrative, Truth, and Trial, 101 GEO. L.J. 281 (2013)
(discussing the relationship between storytelling and factual accuracy in trials); I. Bennett
Capers, Real Woman, Real Rape, 60 UCLA L. REv. 826 (2013) (criticizing rape shield
laws for perpetuating traditional narratives of chastity and rape); Kim Lane Scheppele,
Foreword: Telling Stories, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2073 (1989) (arguing that narrative is a tool
for outsiders to understand legal truths); see also Nancy Pennington & Reid Hastie, A
Cognitive Theory of Juror Decision Making: The Story Model, 13 CARDozo L. REv. 519
(1991) (discussing jurors' cognitive strategies and the critical role that story-telling plays
in analyzing a legal issue).
7 See, e.g., 5 JEREMY BENTHAM, RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE 17 (1827) ("If
there be one business that belongs to a jury . . ,it is, one should think, the judging of the
probability of evidence .... ); Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of'Adjudication, 92
HARV. L. REV. 353, 366 (1978) (discussing rationality as a basis of decision-making);
George F. James, Relevancy, Probability, and the Law, 29 CALIF. L. REV. 689, 694-705
(1941).
75 Griffin, supra note 73, at 294. See also Dan Simon, A Third View ofthe Black Box:
Cognitive Coherence in Legal Decision Making, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 511, 513 (2004)
("[Tihere are deep incompatibilities between actual legal decision making and the pri-
marily Rationalist assumptions on which trials are designed.").
6 Capers, Real Women, Real Rape, supra note 14, at 860. See also Paul Gewirtz,
Narrative and Rhetoric in the Law, in LAW'S STORIES 2, 8-9 (Peter Brooks & Paul
Gewirtz eds., 1996).
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[J]ury reasoning is story-based. Juries convert evidence into fa-
miliar stories, filling in gaps in the evidence where needed to craft
a coherent tale. Whom jurors believe turns on the consistency of
each witness's testimony with the plausible stories that juries cre-
ate based upon their preexisting stock. These stock stories come
from experience and culture, tales learned from the Bible, chil-
dren's tales, television, radio, books, magazines, and movies. Sto-
ries create our world of meaning; they are the lens through which
we view of all life's events.7
This is particularly true in rape cases, where often the only direct wit-
nesses are the accuser and the accused. As Kalen & Zeisel noted nearly a
half-century ago in The American Jury,"8 when confronted with ambiguous
evidence, jurors are more likely to feel "liberated" in assessing the truth.79
Studies show that jurors turn to preconceived "rape scripts" to assess what
"really happened." 0 They turn too to assumptions, including patriarchal as-
sumptions, "about the sexes' similarities and differences, motivations and
needs, strengths and weaknesses."si The jurors, in short, converge "on
whatever stereotypic-consistent imagery and information is available to
them." 82 Using this information, jurors construct an ending/verdict that ac-
cords with narrative expectations of restoring balance.83
This is not to suggest that jurors have free rein in story selection. Evi-
dentiary rules play a significant role in shaping, editing, and culling the sto-
ries they hear.M The Rules of Evidence are, to a large extent, rules about
which stories matter (relevancy), which stories are unreliable (hearsay and
authentication), and which stories are private (privileged). In short, which
stories get told and heard. 5 Even here, though, the interplay between narra-
tive theory and evidentiary rules is more complex, since evidentiary rules are
themselves dependent on norms and topoi (or stock conventions) of story-
telling. That the husband accused of killing his wife was having an extra-
marital affair is only relevant because of our assumptions about stories and
" TASLITZ, supra note 6, at 7-8.
7 See HARRY KALVEN, JR. & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 249-55 (1966).
9 id. at 165.
8o See VALERIE P. HANS & NEIL VIDMAR, JUDGING THE JURY 204 (1986) (finding that
jurors incorporate assumptions-including false assumptions-in rape cases).
1 TASLITZ, supra note 6, at 8.82 Douglas D. Koski, Jury Decisionmaking in Rape Trials: A Review & Empirical
Assessment, 38 CRIM. L. BULL. 21, 128 (2002).
83 Id.
I This is not to suggest that evidentiary rules are the only constraints on courtroom
stories. Constitutional and statutory rules also play a role. For example, a criminal case
may exclude the story of a defendant's confession because her Miranda rights were vio-
lated or include only a redacted confession to preserve a co-defendant's confrontation
clause rights.
8 Peter Brooks makes a similar point: "All of the rules of evidence, including the
much-debated exclusionary rule, touch on the issue of rule-governed storytelling."
Brooks, supra note 7, at 19-20.
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because of our urge to complete stories. We imagine he wanted his freedom,
that there were disadvantages to a divorce. In short, the Rules of Evidence-
both Rule 401 and, more precisely, Rule 104(b)-by recognizing and rely-
ing on "common sense inferences," implicitly incorporate storytelling and
narrative assumptions and permit decision-makers to participate in the crea-
tion of stories as a way of ascertaining "truth."86 Without assumptions
learned from storytelling, the Rules of Evidence would lack meaning. In-
deed, Paul Gewirtz has described "the entire law of evidence" as "really a
law of narrative-a law of narrative transactions.""
This interplay between narrative theory and evidentiary rules has partic-
ular salience in rape trials. That jurors continue to acquit"8 in cases where
they find insufficient evidence of resistance (notwithstanding the relaxation
and even elimination of the resistance requirement in many states) 9 or when
the complainant did not make prompt complaint" or when the accuser's be-
havior post-rape otherwise fails to comport with their expectations about
how a rape victim should act91 points to the continued power of story-based
ideas and assumptions.92 Nor is this just true in cases where jurors acquit.
Narratives and rape scripts also play a determinative role in cases where
jurors reach a verdict of guilty.
Of course, it is impossible to know with certainty what factors played a
role in the jury's decision to return a guilty verdict against Stephens, or what
weight was accorded each factor.93 It seems probable that jurors weighed
'See Fed. R. Evid. 104(b), 401.
* Paul Gewirtz, Victims and Voyeurs: Two Narrative Problems at the Criminal Trial,
in LAW'S STORIES 135, 136 (Peter Brooks & Paul Gewirtz eds., 1996).
"8 Of course, story-based ideas play a role in every decision stage of the proceeding,
including the decision to file charges and prosecute. A prosecutor, in weighing the
strength of a case, will almost invariably wonder how the case will appear to potential
jurors. Will the complainant's version comport with the juror's assumptions about how
women are and should be, and how men are and should be?
89 For a discussion of the role resistance continues to play in rape cases, see Victoria
Nourse, The "Normal" Successes and Failures of Feminism and the Criminal Law, 75
CHI.-KENr L. REV. 951, 956-57 (2000).
91 Michelle J. Anderson, Women Do Not Report the Violence They Suffer: Violence
Against Women and the State Action Doctrine, 46 VILL. L. REV. 907, 937 (2001).
91 Capers, Real Women, Real Rape, supra note 14, at 863.
92 Id. There is also the separate issue of the mode of storytelling in court, which may
disadvantage women in general. See Kim Lane Scheppele, Just the Facts Ma'am: Sexual-
ized Violence, Evidentiary Habits, and the Revision of Truth, 37 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 123,
138-39 (1992) (arguing that many sexual assault victims are initially silent about their
victimization, and then "try to smooth out social relations by minimizing the harm of the
abuse, engaging in self-blame, telling stories that offer alternative explanations of events
so that the full consequences of the abuse do not have to be dealt with at the time, and
disguising the brutality through descriptive distortions of events," all of which is used
against them to undermine their credibility); Kim Lane Scheppele, Foreword: Telling
Stories, 87 MICH. L. REv. 2073, 2083-84 (1989) (arguing that the law tends to privilege
the stories of those who are white and male, and cast aside the stories of those who are
not).
93 Part of the difficulty in knowing what happened in the jury room is attributable
directly to the Rules of Evidence. Because Rule 606 and state cognates limit the use of
juror testimony to impeach a verdict, in effect barring any testimony concerning "any
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Stephens's several false statements and his suborning perjury as reflecting
his consciousness of guilt. It also seems probable that preconceived rape
scripts and assumptions about gender and sex played a role in the jury's
verdict. After all, Stephens's claim was that he knew the woman casually and
that she had essentially given him a standing invitation to visit her in her
trailer.94 For jurors, and perhaps especially for these jurors in rural Indiana,"
this claim alone may have cast Stephens's credibility into doubt, conflicting
perhaps with their assumptions about how women are: She gave him a
standing invitation to come to see her? Women don't do that. Stephens's
claim that the woman was willing to engage in sex with him on the floor of
her living room even though her sister, brother-in-law, son, and nephew
were asleep in the adjacent room may have also struck jurors as inconsistent
with their normative assumptions. In fact, the district court intimated as
much, stating that "the jury would have been hard pressed to believe this
whirlwind courtship took place in a matter of fifteen minutes."9 At the same
time, the woman's version of events-that Stephens entered her home unin-
vited, that he forced himself upon her, and that she resisted to the utmost and
indeed managed to escape his clutches-likely accorded with received
scripts about "good girls," 97 about vulnerable girls, and about how a good
girl would respond.98 Indeed, the woman's version, which downplayed her
acquaintance with Stephens, in several ways fit the paradigmatic rape: the
intruding stranger.9 Perhaps most importantly, Stephens's speculation about
why the woman had alleged rape after first consenting to sex-specifically,
matter or statement occurring during the course of the jury's deliberations," attorneys
rarely have the incentive to draw back the curtain on jury deliberations. See FED. R. EVID.
606(b).
4 Stephens v. Miller, 989 F.2d 264, 260 (7th Cir. 1993).
* For a discussion of how the cultural background and assumptions of jurors have.a
stronger effect than legal definitions in rape cases, see generally Dan M. Kahan, Culture,
Cognition, and Consent: Who Perceives What, and Why, in Acquaintance-Rape Cases,
158 U. PA. L. REV. 729 (2010).
'Stephens v. Morris, 756 F. Supp. 1137, 1143 (N.D. Ind. 1991).
9 The use of the diminutive "girl" here is deliberate. For a discussion of "good
girls" and rape shields, see Capers, Real Women, Real Rape, supra note 14, at 853-57.
98 The assumption, in fact and in the law, has long been that "good girls" should
resist to the utmost. As one court put it, "[I]f a woman, aware that it will be done unless
she does resist, does not resist to the extent of her ability on the occasion, must it not be
that she is not entirely reluctant." People v. Dohring, 59 N.Y. 374, 384 (1874). Judge
Cole made a similar point in State v. Rusk, insisting that a good woman should "follow
the natural instinct of every proud female" and resist. State v. Rusk, 424 A.2d 720, 733
(Md. 1981) (Cole, J., dissenting). Or as Anne Coughlin commented, early rape law al-
lowed men something akin to a "woman's failure of actus reus defense." Anne M.
Coughlin, Sex and Guilt, 84 VA. L. REV. 1, 36 (1998). Such a defense was justifiable on
the notion that rape is a fate worse than death. See generally Corey Rayburn, Better Dead
than Ra(p)ed?: The Patriarchal Rhetoric Driving Capital Rape Statutes, 78 ST. JoHN'S L.
REv. 1119 (2004) (explaining that courts have recently upheld the traditional standard
that physical signs of resistance must be shown to prove rape).
I On the paradigmatic rape, see I. Bennett Capers, The Unintentional Rapist, 87
WASH. U. L. REV. 1345, 1386 (2010); Capers, Real Women, Real Rape, supra note 14, at
860-65.
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his judicially redacted assertion that he said "something" to offend her-
likely struck the jurors as vague and implausible given received rape scripts.
Women, after all, don't allege rape for no reason or just because somebody
said "something." In this sense, the application of the rape shield in exclud-
ing the specifics of his version-his statement "You like it like that, don't
you? Tim Hall said you did."-also shaped how jurors completed the story
of what happened. All of this-as well as class and race assumptions'"-
likely factored into the jury's guilty verdict. In this regard, the role narrative
and rape scripts play in jury decision-making is a crucial one.
But Stephens v. Miller also reveals another aspect of storytelling in rape
trials that, for the most part, remains under-theorized and under-examined:
the stories courts tell. Instead of being above the fray, courts too engage in
storytelling.101 Like other actors in the legal process, courts construct narra-
tives with a goal of persuading official decision-makers, though, in their
case, the official decision-makers are appellate courts. In this sense, legal
opinions, like Janus, look in two directions at once: towards the historical
"facts" and towards the decision's afterlife. As Drucilla Cornell puts it, "Le-
gal interpretation demands that we remember the future." 1 2 And appellate
courts are not the only audience. Lower courts are also concerned about a
more general audience comprised of lawyers, litigants, victims, and the com-
munity at large, and about presenting a narrative marked "by a rhetoric of
certainty and inevitability, a rhetoric that denies the complexity of the prob-
lem before the court and drives with a tone of self-assurance to its
conclusion."1 03
'" Both Stephens and the woman were white. This case therefore does not involve
the rape script that most favored white accusers, that of interracial rape. Historically,
allegations of interracial rape were treated differently as a matter of law, subjecting black
defendants to higher penalties, including capital punishment. Post Reconstruction
Amendments, allegations of interracial rape continued to be treated differently, though
now a type of unwritten law governed the disparate treatment. However, the fact that this
case involved an intra-racial allegation does not render race irrelevant. That the woman
was white likely enhanced her credibility, and supported a rape script that cast her as a
"good girl," or at least a "decent woman." At the same time, Stephens's class-there are
repeated references to suggest he was working class-likely factored against him insofar
as it supported a script that cast him as a never-do-good. For more on the interplay of race
and class in rape scripts, see Capers, The Unintentional Rapist, supra note 99, at
1371-81; Capers, Real Women, Real Rape, supra note 14, at 860-65.
.. Consider the opening line of a recent Confrontation Clause case, Ohio v. Clark,
135 S. Ct. 2173 (2015). Justice Alito begins the opinion by stating, "Darius Clark sent his
girlfriend hundreds of miles away to engage in prostitution and agreed to care for her two
young children while she was out of town." Id. at 2177. This sentence alone tells the
reader that the Court is likely to rule against Clark, especially since little in this sentence
is relevant to the issue at hand, whether Clark was entitled to confront L.P. at trial.
02 Drucilla Cornell, From the Lighthouse: The Promise of Redemption and the Possi-
bility of Legal Interpretation, 11 CARDozo L. REv. 1690, 1709 (1990).
'03 Gewirtz, supra note 76, at 11. Gewirtz adds: "[T]he rhetoric of certainty seems to
result from the perceived need of judges to preserve the institutional authority of the
court. Acknowledging the complexity and ambivalence, on this account, threatens the
legitimacy of a decision backed by state power." Id. See also Paul Gewirtz, On "I Know
It When I See It, " 105 YALE L.J. 1023, 1042 (1996). Other scholars have made similar
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Perhaps even more importantly, courts deploy narrative to naturalize
the coercive force of the state, especially in criminal cases. As Paul Gewirtz
has observed, court opinions usually end with the words "It is so ordered" to
emphasize the court's coercive force.'0 The words themselves function as a
speech act. 105 But the justification for the power is always in the body of the
opinion that precedes those words and in, again, its rhetoric of certainty and
inevitability. As Robert Cover famously observed, "Legal interpretation
takes place in a field of pain and death." 101
These narrative strategies are particularly evident in the case against
Stephens, which generated a total of four published decisions, some of
which contain various concurring and dissenting opinions. Each of these de-
cisions begins with the "facts," though the "facts" differ in important ways
in each opinion. What is included, what is omitted, how events are se-
quenced, and the tone vary. Even the decision of how to identify the com-
plainant-by name, as "the complainant," as the "victim," as the
"prosecutrix"-differs depending on the opinion. An opinion read in isola-
tion may seem certain and inevitable. The opinions read sequentially reveal
each choice to be encumbered and even political. The multiple opinions re-
mind the reader that there is never one univocal story and that even the
"official story" depends on the teller. 07 As Paul Gewirtz observes, "the ex-
istence of multiple opinions defeats the ability of any single opinion to en-
shrine any particular version of reality as the undoubted truth."'" In this
respect, each "text announces the elements of its own indeterminacy.""
That the courts in Stephens v. Miller were engaged in "strategies of
discourse"" 0 and "appeals to pathos""' becomes apparent in ways both
small and large, in ways both subtle and less so. Allow me to return to the
decision about how to describe the woman. For the Indiana Supreme Court,
observations. See Robert Ferguson, The Judicial Opinion as a Literary Genre, 2 YALE J.
L. & HUMAN. 201, 206-07 (1990) ("The one thing a judge never admits in the moment of
decision is freedom of choice. [The opinion] must instead appear as if forced to its
inevitable conclusion."); David Luban, Difference Made Legal: The Court and Dr. King,
87 MIcH. L. REV. 2152, 2153 (1989) (court "narratives must dovetail in an improbable
mutual correspondence that legitimizes both the favored conclusion and the political nar-
rative that embeds it.").
'" Gewirtz, supra note 76, at 10. Even this coercive force is disembodied and made
to seem inevitable. Most opinions do not end, "The Court so orders." Most opinions end,
"It is so ordered."
105 In other words, the words themselves accomplish something and therefore amount
to an act. On speech acts generally, and declarative speech acts in particular, see JOHN
SEARLE, SPEECH AcTs (1969).
'" Cover, supra note 8.i0 Gewirtz, supra note 76, at 11.
'
0 Id. at 11.
'" Id. at 12 (emphasis added).
10 This term comes for the literary theorist Homi Bhabha. See Homi K. Bhabha, The
Commitment to Theory, 5 NEW FORMATIONs 5, 19 (1988).
"'1 On the merits of pathetic arguments generally, see Jamal Greene, Pathetic Argu-
ment in Constitutional Law, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 1389, 1390-91 (2013).
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she is "the victim;"" 2 for the federal district court, she is "the prosecu-
trix.""3 It is the three-judge Seventh Circuit decision-the one decision to
side with Stephens and grant his writ of habeas-that is the first to refer to
her by name, Melissa Wilburn.114
The attributes assigned to Lonnie Stephens also vary depending on the
court. The first Seventh Circuit decision includes the following: "Stephens
and his friend, David Stone ('Stone'), did automotive work together during
the day and later went out drinking.""' By contrast, as described by the
district court, Lonnie Stephens comes across as a complete lay-about: unem-
ployed and drunk. The district court tells the reader Stephens went to the
woman's house "[affter almost a full day of drinking beer.""' Indeed, an-
other aspect becomes apparent upon closer inspection: that notwithstanding
evidence law's ban on character evidence, such evidence permeates cases
and permeates judicial opinions. What else are we to think when we are told
about Stephens's almost "full day of drinking beer," if not his character?"'
The first Seventh Circuit decision is also more generous in including
Stephens's version of events and in doing so fills in the details that seem
glaringly missing from the en banc decision. Whereas the en bane decision
tells us that Stephens knew the woman as a "casual acquaintance," the first
Seventh Circuit decision tells us what that means. Stephens had previously
talked with the woman, "who told him that she was separated from her hus-
band and had moved.""' She had "invited Stephens to visit her
sometime."" 9
Reading the en banc decision, one is also struck by other gaps and
omissions. Consider, for example, how the en banc court begins its descrip-
tion of Stephens's version of events:
Stephens testified at trial and painted a quite different picture of
the evening's events. He claimed that [the woman] invited him
into her trailer after [his friend David Stone] dropped him off.
Stephens stated that when he entered the trailer, [the woman's]
Il2 Stephens v. State, 544 N.E.2d 137, 138 (Ind. 1989).
" Stephens v. Morris, 756 F. Supp. 1137, 1139 (N.D. Ind. 1991).
114 Stephens v. Miller, 989 F.2d 264, 266 (7th Cir. 1993).
"
5 Id. at 265.
116 Stephens v. Morris, 756 F. Supp. at 1140.
" Richard Polenberg makes a similar observation about Justice Cardozo's opinion in
People v. Zackowitz, a case which stands for the principle that character evidence is
inadmissible. 254 N.Y. 192 (N.Y. 1930). But even in explaining why such evidence is
inadmissible, Justice Cardozo relies on the character of the defendant. Ironically, Car-
dozo's decision was "based largely on his assessment of the defendant's character." Rich-
ard Polenberg, Law and Character: The "Saintly" Cardozo: Character and the Criminal
Law, 71 U. COLO. L. REV. 1311, 1311 (2000). To be sure, it is possible to imagine a non-
character purpose for this evidence-perhaps his drinking was referenced to show that
alcohol may have made him less inhibited or more sexually aggressive. However, one
senses the opinions mean to convey more.
" Stephens v. Miller, 989 F.2d at 266.
" Id.
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son was asleep on the couch. Stephens carried him to one of the
bedrooms .... 120
Elisions abound. For example, the en banc decision tells the reader
nothing about how Stephens claimed he gained entry into the trailer. With
this and other omissions, questions begin to insist themselves, and one be-
gins to see that such omissions may serve strategic purposes and divert the
reader from evidence that may undermine the certainty and inevitability of
the law's violence. For example, since the en banc opinion merely describes
Stephens and the woman as casual acquaintances, how is it that he comes to
carry her son to one of the bedrooms? Did she ask him to? Did he do so
unprompted? Did she protest or acquiesce? By contrast, the earlier, more
generous Seventh Circuit decision fills in much of this detail, making a more
complete and complicated picture. "When Stone dropped Stephens off at the
trailer, Stephens knocked on the door and [the woman] let him in. [The
woman] told Stephens she could take him home, so Stephens told Stone to
leave."'21 Inside, the woman's son was asleep on the couch, so Stephens
carried him into one of the bedrooms.1 22
Other differences are subtler yet equally significant. Consider the
description of how the woman eventually fends off Stephens's advances. The
opinions are relatively uniform in describing the actions of Stephens, at least
from the woman's point of view, with respect to his actions in throwing her
on the couch, undoing her bra, and tearing a button from her shirt. But note
the difference in language the various opinions use to describe the woman's
resistance-again, a crucial point for decision-makers notwithstanding re-
forms relaxing the legal requirement of resistance. Per the Seventh Circuit
en banc plurality decision, the woman "pushed Stephens off of her."'23 The
three-judge Seventh Circuit panel uses similar language: the woman "strug-
gled and eventually pushed Stephens off, and he fell to the floor."l2 4 Both of
these descriptions accord with received rape scripts and gender expectations
about how good girls should resist to the utmost. Now compare these de-
scriptions to the language from the district court and the Indiana Supreme
Court. Per the district court, "the prosecutrix was able to shift her body
weight which caused the petitioner to lose his balance and fall to the
Stephens v. Miller, 13 F.3d 998, 1000 (7th Cir. 1994) (en banc).
121 Stephens v. Miller, 989 F.2d at 266.
122 Id. Perhaps not surprisingly, the attorneys representing Stephens and Indiana also
shaded the "facts" to advance their goals. Consider the opening of the State's brief in
opposition to the petition before the Seventh Circuit: "On March 17, at around 10:00-
uninvited and drunk-Petitioner entered the trailer" of the woman, an acquaintance of
his. Brief for Respondents in Opposition at 1, Stephens v. Miller, 13 F.3d 998 (7th Cir.
1994) (No. 93-1734). It continues: "Petitioner made three unwanted, and increasingly
aggressive, sexual advances toward her, each of which she rebuffed." Id. Eventually,
"Petitioner violently attacked" the woman and attempted to rape her. Id. at 2.
" Stephens v. Miller, 13 F.3d at 1000.
124 Stephens v. Miller, 989 F.2d at 266.
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floor," 25 a description that seems to attribute the woman's escape to happen-
stance rather than a deliberate act of resistance. The Indiana Supreme Court
takes the opposite tack. In that decision, as Stephens "reached down to undo
his trousers, the victim flipped him off of her," 26 a show of resistance that is
stronger but which potentially cuts against the victim, since such strength
may be inconsistent with jurors' assumptions about femininity and
vulnerability.
Perhaps the most revealing narrative choice is that concerning subse-
quent "facts." I mentioned earlier that Stephens's demonstrably false state-
ments-he lied to the police and encouraged his friend Stone to lie at trial-
probably played a significant role in the jury's decision to credit the woman
and find Stephens guilty of attempted rape. Not surprisingly, Stephens's false
statements are given prominent space in the Seventh Circuit en banc plural-
ity opinion. But there were other subsequent events that seem equally impor-
tant and yet are withheld in the opinion. Perhaps most glaring is the
plurality's decision to withhold information which may have added complex-
ity to the woman's motives for going to the police. For this, one would have
to comb through dissents or read the district court decision.
This is what we know from the district court opinion: Later on the eve-
ning of March 17, 1987, the woman's estranged husband called her, and the
woman told him that Stephens had tried to rape her. Her husband responded
by going to Stephens's residence and then going to the woman's trailer some-
time between 1:00 a.m. and 1:30 a.m.1 27
When her husband arrived, he was in an agitated state and made
enough noise to wake the prosecutrix's sister and brother-in-law.
Her brother-in-law and husband became involved in a verbal and
physical altercation which caused the prosecutrix's sister to call the
police. By the time the police arrived the situation between the two
men had calmed down. While the police were present, neither the
prosecutrix nor any other person told the police about the alleged
attempted rape by Stephens. In fact, there was no report made to
any law enforcement agency about Stephens until after the prose-
cutrix was confronted by her landlady.
The following evening the prosecutrix was in an automobile with
her brother-in-law when she was stopped by the landlady, Pat Bos-
worth, who complained about the police being called for the dis-
turbance in her trailer. The landlady told the prosecutrix that she
would not have any problems in her trailer park. Even though the
1 Stephens v. Morris, 756 F. Supp. 1137, 1139 (N.D. Ind. 1991).
126 Stephens v. State, 544 N.E.2d 137, 138 (Ind. 1989).
127 See Stephens v. Morris, 756 F. Supp. at 1139. According to Stephens, the wo-
man's husband showed up at Stephens's trailer sometime between 12:30 a.m. and 1:00
a.m. and demanded to know what Stephens was doing "trying to screw his old lady." Id.
at 1141.
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landlady was talking about the police being called in response to
the fight between her husband and brother-in-law, the prosecutrix
indicated to the landlady that the police were called because Ste-
phens was an intruder in her trailer. The landlady suggested that
the prosecutrix go to the police to get a restraining order. The pros-
ecutrix and her brother-in-law went to the Blackford County Jail
where the prosecutrix stated that she needed to report an attempted
rape. She was referred to the Hartford City Police Department,
where she made the report.1 28
These events were entirely omitted from the plurality opinion. One senses
that the majority knew these subsequent events would unsettle and muddle
the teleology of the narrative, that they would cut against accepted "rape
scripts," that these events would undermine the "always-already" 129 present
goal of certainty and inevitability. Peter Brooks's observation that story-
telling "is never innocent" 3 0 becomes equally applicable to courts.
What all of this suggests may seem intuitive: that every telling-even a
retelling based on a transcript and told by a supposedly "neutral" commen-
tator-is suspect. Even my telling is suspect. Why write, as I did in one of
the preceding paragraphs, that "the woman was willing to engage in sex
with him on the floor of her living room" instead of writing "on the floor of
her trailer"? Even my calling her "the woman" is strategic, as I acknowl-
edge in a footnote.'31
Catherine MacKinnon has written, "[I]n postmodernity, where no one
actually lives, interpretations are infinite."'32 While we do not exist in a state
of postmodernity, and thus do not have the possibility of infinite interpreta-
tions, we do have the reality of multiple interpretations which exponentially
grow with each retelling, and this reality applies to court opinions as well.
Courts too engage in shaping and controlling the narrative and "constitutive
rhetoric."'33 Indeed, the process of interpretation antedates the telling and
begins with the reading. After all, every criminal court opinion begins with a
reading: a reading of the transcript,'TM a reading of memoranda and briefs, a
'2 Stephens v. Morris, 756 F. Supp. at 1139-40.
129 For a discussion of what "always-already" constituted, see Louis Althusser, Ideol-
ogy and Ideological State Apparatuses, in LENIN AND PHILOSOPHY AND OTHER ESSAYS
85, 119 (1971) ("Ideology has always-already interpolated individuals as subjects ....
Hence individuals are 'abstract' with respect to the subjects which they always-already
are.").
0 Brooks, supra note 7, at 16.
" See infra note 17.
132 Catherine A. MacKinnon, Low's Stories as Reality, in LAW'S STORIES 232, 234
(Peter Brooks & Paul Gewirtz eds., 1996).
"I James Boyd White, Law as Rhetoric, Rhetoric as the Law: The Arts of Cultural
and Communal Life, 52 U. CI. L. REV. 684, 690 (1985).
1 Transcripts of course are incomplete. As Elaine Craig notes, transcripts "omit
some oral communication (such as sighing, groaning, or weeping) and fail to capture
most nonverbal content (such as tone of voice, facial expression, body language, and
affect)." See Elaine Craig, The Inhospitable Court, 66 U. TORONTo L.J. 197, 201 (2015);
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reading of other opinions and statutes, and, for the trial court at least, a
"reading" of the witnesses involved. Except for the part about witnesses, the
same is true of appellate courts. All of this prompts a question: if judges
reading a transcript necessarily engage in interpretation"' and, in the re-
telling, shade the facts through a process of inclusion and exclusion, what
"truth" should we expect of the witnesses themselves?
James Boyd White once argued that a verdict does not necessarily end
the narrative of a crime. 36 Although a jury may hear certain competing sto-
ries and select one to serve as the authoritative version on which to base
their verdict, the verdict will ultimately depend on "community acceptance"
and validation.137 White observed:
[A legal] judgment is always incomplete, for it always depends
upon what happens in the other world of ordinary narrative and
private life in which it must work and which it cannot control ....
It is not that the legal judgment has no authority, but that its au-
thority is not absolute.'38
White is correct, to be sure. But thinking about Stephens v. Miller reveals the
friction even between the verdict and community acceptance. What does it
mean for community acceptance when differing opinions reveal how laden
and subjective "what really happened" remains, even after a verdict? What
is the community to make of judicial narratives that overlap but never quite
fit together? Or of each court's role in silencing the stories that disrupt the
court's conception of the truth?1 39 And what does it mean, for court opinions
in particular and for criminal justice more broadly, when judicial storytelling
reveals itself to be tainted, to be impure? What does it mean to recognize
that a court opinion, like any other story, is never "morally neutral"?'E In
rape cases in particular, what does it mean to throw back at courts the very
see also Austin Sarat, Rhetoric and Remembrance: Trials, Transcription, and the Politics
of Critical Reading, 23 LEGAL STuD. F. 355, 361 (1999).
"I See Sarat, supra note 134, at 361 ("[T]he trial transcript offers itself up for inter-
pretation. While it may 'freeze' the record, the transcript cannot govern its own
interpretation.").
136 JAMES BOYD WHITE, HERACLES' Bow: ESSAYS ON THE RHETORIC AND POETICS OF
LAW 185-86 (1985).
137 Id. at 185.
'
3 1 Id. at 191.
139 Feminist theorists in particular have called attention to the way law functions as a
system of power, deciding what can be said, and what must be silenced, in a way that
harms women. See, e.g., Kathleen Lahey, On Silences, Screams and Scholarship: An
Introduction to Feminist Legal Theory, in CANADIAN PERSPECTIVES ON LEGAL THEORY
319, 319 (Richard F. Devlin ed., 1991); Linda Finley, Breaking Women's Silence in Law:
The Dilemma of the Gendered Nature of Legal Reasoning, 64 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 886,
892-95 (1989). With the rise of what Janet Halley calls "Governance Feminism," Janet
Halley et al., From the International to the Local in Feminist Legal Responses to Rape,
Prostitution/Sex Work, and Sex Trafficking: Four Studies in Contemporary Governance
Feminism, 29 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 335, 340-42 (2006), other voices are now being
silenced as well, as was the case in Stephens v. Miller.
'1 Brooks, supra note 7, at 16.
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words they have used to describe complainants: "practiced," 4' "unchaste,"
and "impure"? And what does it mean for rape law if, after decades of
reform, we are still stuck at stories and still no closer to the right judgments,
by which I mean judgments, whether guilty or no, that give us epistemic
comfort that the jurors' decision was based on all necessary evidence? Cer-
tainly these are questions worth asking and pondering, and certainly these
questions should inform the weight and authority we give opinions.
U. RAPE SHIELDS
There is another reason that Stephens v. Miller is interesting. Nearly
forty years after feminists secured passage of the federal rape shield rule and
a host of state cognates, rape shield laws continue to be problematic, flawed,
and-most troubling of all-unpredictable, especially when it comes to the
exception that allows evidence of a complainant's sexual history where do-
ing so is necessary to protect the defendant's constitutional rights.1 42 The en
banc decision in Stephens v. Miller, perhaps more than any other case, places
these flaws in sharp relief. It speaks volumes that eleven judges of the Sev-
enth Circuit issued seven opinions: four judges joined the plurality decision,
two judges wrote concurring opinions, and four judges wrote dissenting
opimons.
To make sense of the difficulties that inhere in applying rape shield
rules to a case like Stephens v. Miller-indeed, to innumerable rape cases-
it pays to begin not with Stephens v. Miller but with Rule 412 itself, which
was signed into law on October 28, 1978, as the centerpiece of the Privacy
Protection for Rape Victims Act. 143 The bill's principal sponsor, Representa-
tive Elizabeth Holtzman, made clear the goal was to close evidentiary doors
that put rape victims themselves on trial and made rape prosecutions so diffi-
cult to prosecute:
Too often in this country victims of rape are humiliated and
harassed when they report and prosecute the rape. Bullied and
cross-examined about their prior sexual experiences, many find the
trial almost as degrading as the rape itself. Since rape trials be-
come inquisitions into the victim's morality, not trials of the defen-
dant's innocence or guilt, it is not surprising that it is the least
reported crime... [I]t is permissible still to subject rape victims to
brutal cross-examination about their past sexual histories. H.R.
4727 would rectify this problem in Federal courts and I hope, also
serve as a model to suggest to the remaining states that reform of
14 People v. Abbott, 19 Wend. 192, 195 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1838) ("Will you not more
readily infer assent in the practiced Messalina . ?").
142 See infra notes 159 through 171 and accompanying text.
14 Privacy Protection for Rape Victims Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-540, 92 Stat.
2046.
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existing rape laws is important to the equity of our criminal justice
system. '4
Then-Senator Joe Biden also spoke in support of passage:
The enactment of this legislation will eliminate the traditional de-
fense strategy. .. of placing the victim and her reputation on trial
in lieu of the defendant [and] end the practice . . . wherein rape
victims are bullied and cross-examined about their prior sexual ex-
perience[, making] the trial almost as degrading as the rape
itself. 14
President Jimmy Carter also spoke when signing Rule 412 into law, describ-
ing the rule as intended "to end the public degradation of rape victims and,
by protecting victims from humiliation, to encourage the reporting of
rape."1 46
The result was Rule 412 of the Federal Rule of Evidence, which de-
clared inadmissible, in any criminal proceedingl 47 involving alleged sexual
misconduct, any evidence of the alleged victim's past sexual behavior or
sexual predisposition whether offered as substantive evidence or for im-
peachment.1 48 Rule 412 permits only three exceptions to this ban. One, such
evidence may be admitted when offered "to prove that someone other than
the defendant was the source of semen, injury, or other physical evi-
dence." 49 Two, such evidence may be admitted if it constitutes "sexual be-
' 124 CONG. REC. 24, 913 (1978) (statement of Rep. Holtzman).
145 Id. at 36, 256 (statement of Sen. Biden).
`6 14 WEEKLY COMPILATION OF PRESIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS 1902 (Oct. 30, 1978).
14 Rule 412 was later amended to apply to civil cases as well.
148 FED. R. EviD. 412(a). For example, the rape shield rule has resulted in the exclu-
sion of the following evidence at trial: 1) the alleged victim's "general reputation in
around the Army post"; 2) the victim's "habit of calling out to the barracks to speak to
various and sundry soldiers"; 3) the victim's "habit of coming to the post to meet people
and of her habit for being at the barracks at the snack bar"; 4) evidence from the alleged
victim's former landlord regarding his experience with her promiscuity; and 5) a social
worker's opinion of the alleged victim. Doe v. United States, 666 F.2d 43, 47 (4th Cir.
1981).
14 FED. R. EvID. 412(b)(1)(A). For example, in a rape trial in which the prosecution
sought to introduce evidence that a rape kit examination following the alleged incident
revealed the presence of semen, the defense would be permitted to introduce evidence
that the semen originated from another person. This exception is sometimes referred to as
the "Scottsboro rebuttal," based on the case in which nine black youths were accused of
raping two white women on a freight train. 23 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, FEDERAL PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE § 5388 (1980). In its case in chief, the prosecution offered medical
testimony to establish the presence of semen. In response, the defense was eventually
allowed to introduce evidence that the women, who were both prostitutes, had had inter-
course with two other men the night before, and medical testimony that the small amount
of semen found was inconsistent with the gang rape allegation, and that the semen was
non-motile, indicating it had been present at least twelve hours prior to the women board-
ing the train. DAN. T. CARTER, SCoTTsBoRo: A ThAGEDY OF THE AMERICAN SOUTH
81-84, 213, 229-30 (1969) Notwithstanding the paucity of the evidence and the fact that
one of the women recanted and testified for the defense, the nine youths were repeatedly
convicted. JAMES GOODMAN, STORIES OF SCorrsoRO 393-95, 414 (1994).
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havior [by the alleged victim] with respect to the person accused of the
sexual misconduct, if offered by the defendant to prove consent or if offered
by the prosecutor."5 0 Three, such evidence is admissible if "exclusion
would violate the defendant's constitutional rights."'
Perhaps not surprisingly, Rule 412 and similar state rules have been
controversial since their inception. For victim advocates, rape shield rules
have not protected rape victims as hoped.15 2 Indeed, for many proponents,
the exceptions-particularly the constitutional catch-all exception-have
swallowed the rule, rendering the shield a sieve.'53 Rape shields certainly
have not leveled the playing field for victims of rape. Rapes remain under-
reported,'" conviction rates remain low,' and victims who come forward
continue to face demeaning and victim-blaming cross-examination in the
courtroom amounting to a "second victimization."'56 On the other side,
'" FED. R. EVID. 412(b)(1)(B). Thus, where the defense is consent, the rape shield
rule would not prohibit the defendant from introducing evidence, through cross-examina-
tion or otherwise, that he had previously engaged in consensual sexual activity with his
accuser. For example, in People v. Jovanovic, 700 N.Y.S.2d 156 (App. Div. 1999), the
court ruled that emails in which the accuser described herself as enjoying sadomasochis-
tic sex and enjoying being a "slave" were admissible as conduct with the accused. Id. at
169-70. It should be noted that this exception, rather than changing the common law, is
consistent with the common law.
'`' FED. R. Evio. 412(b)(1)(C). This exception has been described as a "catch-basin"
because it allows courts wide discretion in determining when a state's interest in exclud-
ing sexual history must give way to a defendant's right to confront witnesses or present a
defense. See Harriet R. Galvin, Shielding Rape Victims in the State and Federal Courts: A
Proposal for the Second Decade, 70 MINN. L. REV. 763, 775 (1986). This exception has
been read as allowing the admission of sexual history evidence to show bias, Olden v.
Kentucky, 488 U.S. 227, 231-32 (1988); to show evidence of prior sexual knowledge,
LaJoie v. Thompson, 217 F.3d 663, 671-73 (9th Cir. 2000); and to show prior false
accusations, Redmond v. Kingston, 240 F.3d 590, 592 (7th Cir. 2001).
152 CASSIA SPOHN & JULIE HORNEY, RAPE LAW REFORM: A GRASSROOTs REVOLU-
TION AND ITS IMPACT 155 (1992) (finding modest benefits of rape law reform, with those
benefits accruing largely to victims in stranger-rape cases); Nancy E. Snow, Evaluating
Rape Shield Laws: Why the Law Continues to Fail Rape Victims, in A MOST DETESTABLE
CRIME: NEW PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS ON RAPE 245, 245 (Keith Burgess-Jackson ed.,
1999) (noting that "[riecent studies of the impact of rape shield legislation conclude that
its value has been largely 'symbolic"').
"' Rape shield laws have been applied haphazardly and incoherently. As Michelle
Anderson observed almost a decade ago, "Cases managed to slip past rape shields when
they involved women previously intimate with the defendant, women who frequented
bars to attract new sexual partners, prostitutes, or other women deemed similarly promis-
cuous." Michelle J. Anderson, From Chastity Requirement to Sexuality License: Sexual
Consent and a New Rape Shield Law, 70 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 51, 55 (2002).
" Michelle J. Anderson, The Legacy of the Prompt Complaint Requirement, Corrob-
oration Requirement, and Cautionary Instructions on Campus Sexual Assault, 84 B.U. L.
REV. 945, 986 (2004); Moriah Silver, The Second Rape: Legal Options for Rape Survi-
vors to Terminate Parental Rights, 48 FAM. L.Q. 515, 518-19 (2014).
"' David P. Bryden & Sonja Lengnick, Rape in the Criminal Justice System, 87 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1194, 1199 (1997) (concluding that rape law reforms have
"generally had little or no effect on the outcomes of rape cases"); Yxta Maya Murray,
Rape Trauma, the State, and the Art of Tracey Emins, 100 CALIF. L. REV. 1631, 1657-60
(2012).
1"6 LEE MADIGAN & NANCY C. GAMBLE, THE SECOND RAPE: SOCIETY'S CONTINUED
BETRAYAL OF THE VicrIM 29-36 (1991); GREGORY M. MATOESIAN, REPRODUCING RAPE:
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many defense attorneys have been critical as well, but for entirely different
reasons. For these critics, rape shields exclude relevant evidence that would
aid in trial's truth-seeking function. These critics also complain that rape
shield rules unfairly curtail a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to confront
witnesses and to present evidence in his own defense.'
Stephens v. Miller' reflects this dissatisfaction. While rape shield's ex-
ceptions are straightforward and easily applied, at least most of the time, the
constitutional catch-all exception seems amorphous, malleable, and subjec-
tive. When will the exclusion of sexual behavior evidence "violate the de-
fendant's constitutional rights"? In Stephens v. Miller, the defendant hinged
his argument on his constitutional right to testify in his own defense. But
already, this "right" needs clarification since it is nowhere included in the
Bill of Rights and rather is an implied right. But what other rights are im-
plied? For example, the Court has also inferred, via the Sixth Amendment's
right to confront witnesses, an implied right "to show a prototypical form of
bias on the part of the witness."' Even more amorphous, if every defendant
has a general Due Process right to a "fair" trial, how do we determine when
that right is violated? In Chambers v. Mississippi'" the Court held that
where testimony is critical to a criminal defendant, is supported by "persua-
sive assurances of trustworthiness," 6 1 and directly affects the ascertainment
of guilt, the Rules of Evidence may not be applied "mechanistically to de-
feat the ends of justice,"'62 but the reach of the holding remains unclear. Nor
did the Court add much clarity in Holmes v. South Carolina,'63 in which it
read the Due Process Clause as guaranteeing criminal defendants "'a mean-
ingful opportunity to present a complete defense.'6 But what exactly is a
meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense?
DOMINATION THROUGH TALK IN THE COURTROOM 91-107 (1993); TASLITZ, supra note 6,
at 81-99; cf. Morrison Torrey, When Will We Be Believed? Rape Myths and the Idea of a
Fair Trial in Rape Prosecutions, 24 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1013, 1059 (1991) (observing
that in "many rape prosecutions, the victim, for all practical purposes, becomes a pseudo-
defendant"); Vivian Berger, Man's Trial, Woman's Tribulation: Rape Cases in the Court-
room, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 12 (1977) (noting that rape cases often put the "victim on
trial").
17 See, e.g., David S. Rudstein, Rape Shield Lws: Some Constitutional Problems,
18 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 14-46 (1976); Alexander Tanford & Anthony Boachio, Rape
Victim Shield Laws and the Sixth Amendment, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 544, 556-60 (1980);
Frederick Eisenbud, Note, Limitations on the Right to Introduce Evidence Pertaining to
the Prior Sexual History of the Complaining Witness in Cases of Forcible Rape: Reflec-
tion of Reality or Denial of Due Process?, 3 HOFSTRA L. REV. 403, 419-25 (1975).
159 13 F.3d 998 (7th Cir. 1994) (en banc).
1 Olden v. Kentucky, 488 U.S. 227, 231 (1988); see also Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S.
308, 316 (1974). Of course, what constitutes a "prototypical" form of bias remains a
point of contention.
16 410 U.S. 284 (1973).
161 Id. at 302.
162 Id.
163 547 U.S. 319 (2006).
1" Id. at 324 (2006) (quoting Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683 (1986)).
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To further complicate matters, even if the defendant has a constitutional
right at issue to trigger an exception under Rule 412, the admissibility of
evidence relating to a complainant's sexual history can still be curtailed. For
example, while a defendant has a constitutional right to testify, that right is
not absolute and may be circumscribed to accommodate other legitimate in-
terests in the trial process.' As the en banc court in Stephens v. Miller
observed by analogy, a defendant may have a right to testify, but there is no
"constitutional right to commit perjury," and "numerous procedural and
state evidentiary rules control the presentation of evidence and do not offend
a criminal defendant's right to testify." 66 But how should one balance the
state interests against a defendant's constitutional right? And as Stephens
asked in his petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court, what role, if any,
should the court's assessment of the credibility of the evidence play?1 67 What
standard should a court apply in judging the importance of the evidence to
the defense?'16 In whose favor should any doubt be resolved?'69 Rather than
addressing these issues, the plurality opinion in Stephens v. Miller skirted
them7 o and held simply that the trial court:
properly balanced Stephens's right to testify with Indiana's interest
because it allowed him to testify about what happened and that he
said something that upset the complainant.. . .The interests served
by the Indiana Rape Shield Statute justify this very minor imposi-
tion on Stephens's right to testify."'
Given this vague balancing test, it was easy for the dissenting judges to
apply the same test and reach the opposite conclusion, that Stephens was
deprived of his constitutional right to testify.
But these are only some of the difficulties presented by Rule 412 and
state cognates. As I have explored elsewhere, the main argument in favor of
rape shield rules-that sexual history is irrelevantl 72 -upon close inspection
'65 See Michigan v. Lucas, 500 U.S. 145, 149 (1991); Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44,
55 (1987).
* Stephens v. Miller, 13 F.3d 998, 1002 (7th Cir. 1994) (en banc).
167 Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 17, Stephens v. Miller, 13 F.3d 998 (1994) (No.
93-1734),
'
66 Id. at 18.169 Id. at 16.
70 Stephens, 13 F.3d at 1012 (Cuhady, J., dissenting) (describing the majority's treat-
ment of the balancing test as "cursory").
171 Id. at 1002.
17 2 See, e.g., Deborah Tuerkheimer, Judging Sex, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 1461, 1467-68
(2012) ("Regardless of normative assessments of its worth, sexual history is not proba-
tive of consent."); Galvin, Shielding Rape, supra note 151, at 799 ("[T]he mere fact that
the complainant has previously engaged in consensual sexual activity affords no basis for
inferring consent on a later occasion."); Rosemary C. Hunter, Gender in Evidence: Mas-
culine Norms vs. Feminist Reforms, 19 HARV. WOMEN's L.J. 127, 131 (1996) ("The no-
tion that any woman who has consented once to sex is likely to consent always, if it was
ever acceptable, cannot now be sustained.").
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reveals itself to be remarkably weak. 173 It certainly cannot be squared with
the very liberal approach normally accorded relevancy. Rule 401, after all,
defines as "relevant" evidence that has "any tendency to make a fact more
or less probable than it would be without the evidence." 74 The scale is not
just tipped towards admissibility. It is weighted such that George Fisher has
observed it "would be hard to devise a more lenient test of probativeness
than Rule 401's 'any tendency' standard." 75 While prior consent is not pro-
bative of consent always, it is slightly probative of consent in the future,
which is all Rule 401's "any tendency" standard requires. Indeed, if sexual
history had no bearing on consent, one would conclude that whether or not a
complainant was an avowed virgin or a lesbian would be irrelevant to coun-
tering a consent defense. In fact, courts have admitted such evidence.' 76 The
claim that "sexual history is irrelevant" is also difficult to square with more
mundane evidence that it is routinely admitted in sexual assault cases, in-
cluding background evidence. 7 7 Consider People v. Jovanovic,78 a rape case
in which the jury learned that the complainant was a "Barnard undergradu-
ate" from "Salamanca, a small town in upstate New York," and that the
defendant was a fan of the photographer Joel-Peter Witkin.1 79 If such mun-
dane information has probative value, then excluding sexual history evi-
dence solely on the ground that it lacks any probative value does not make
sense.
There is also the problem of internal inconsistency. For example, if sex-
ual history is irrelevant and is not probative of consent, then the exception
allowing evidence of "sexual behavior with respect to the person ac-
73 Capers, Real Women, Real Rape, supra note 14, at 847-49.
174 FED. R. EVID. 401.
'7 GEORGE FISHER, EVIDENCE 23 (3d ed. 2013); see also Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 588 (1993) (noting that the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence in general have a "liberal thrust").
176 Capers, Real Women, Real Rape, supra note 14, at 850-51; see, e.g., People v.
Prentiss, 172 P.3d 917, 923-24 (Colo. App. 2006) (permitting defendant to offer evi-
dence of victim's alleged non-virginity as evidence he did not cause her hymenal injury);
State v. Preston, 427 A.2d 32, 33-34 (N.H. 1981) (permitting victim's testimony about
her virginity as evidence of lack of consent); State v. Gavigan, 330 N.W.2d 571, 575-78
(Wis. 1983) (permitting victim to repeat her conversation with defendant, during which
she identified herself as a virgin and Christian); see also Commonwealth v. McKay, 294
N.E.2d 213, 224-25 (Mass. 1973) (concluding that virginity has probative value on the
issue of consent, but that lack of virginity does not). A court has also permitted an alleged
victim to introduce evidence that she is a lesbian to refute any claim that she consented to
sex with the male defendant. Meaders v. United States, 519 A.2d 1248, 1256-57 (D.C.
1986) (Gallagher, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("It is almost too obvious
to mention that-where consent is the issue (as here)-if the complaining witness offers
on direct examination, among other things, that she is a lesbian, this may seriously impair
a defense of consent to the charged rape.").
"' Capers, Real Women, Real Rape, supra note 14, at 850-51. This is not to say that
rape shield laws cannot be justified on policy grounds-that they protect complainants
from embarrassment and may encourage more victims to come forward. Rather, this is to
say that oft-articulated rationale, relevancy, is on closer inspection insufficient.
7" 700 N.Y.S.2d 156 (N.Y. App. Div. 1999).
1
7 9 Id. at 159-60.
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cused"'"0-a standard exception in rape shields-is deeply problematic. Put
differently, if we accept that one always has the right to refuse consent,
whether the person seeking consent is the person's husband,"' boyfriend,1 82
or a stranger, then permitting an exception for husbands and boyfriends to
introduce the complainant's sexual history with them on the ground that
prior consent is relevant in these cases is difficult to justify.
Going beyond the surface of rape shield laws, there is also the problem
related to the expressive message communicated by rape shield laws: on a
certain level, they reinscribe the chastity requirement that feminists hoped to
abolish. Allow me to elaborate. By concealing evidence of sexuality, rape
shields in effect encourage jurors to assume that the victim is chaste, or at
least a "good girl."' Rather than communicating that everyone is entitled to
sexual autonomy and agency, rape shields in effect communicate the norma-
tive message that sexuality is something to be "concealed, corseted, and
locked away."l8 4 In short, rather than fostering a space for greater sexual
liberty or disrupting history's chastity requirement, rape shields have the ef-
fect of entrenching such requirements further. They communicate that jurors
should assume the alleged complainant is without a sexual past, that she is
de facto chaste, or at least not sexually active, and thus deserving of the
law's protection. The effect is decidedly retrograde.
Beyond this, the effect of Rule 412 is likely racially inflected. As the
discussion of narrative and rape scripts in Part II should make clear, it is a
fallacy to assume that when jurors are told nothing, they assume nothing.
Rather, jurors fall back on default assumptions and stereotypes to assess
what "really happened."' While white women who are presented' 86 as de-
mure may fit the script of a "good girl" and thus benefit from rape shield's
protections, women who do not fit this script, and men,'87 may not. Jurors
may assume an Asian woman is "exotically sexual [and] willingly submis-
'"FED. R. Evio). 412(b)(1)(B3).
8s For a discussion of the demise of marital immunity for rape, see Jill Elaine Has-
day, Contest and Consent: A Legal History of Marital Rape, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 1373
(2000).
182 For example, in the case State v. Alston, 312 S.E.2d 470 (N.C. 1984), where the
evidence showed that the boyfriend beat his girlfriend, threatened to "fix her face," id. at
472, and then raped her, it should strike us as strange that the rape shield would provide
no bar to the defendant offering evidence that the victim had engaged in sexual activities
with him in the past. For more on this case, see Camille A. Nelson, Consistently Re-
vealing the Inconsistencies: The Construction of Fear in Criminal Law, 48 ST. Louis U.
L.J. 1261, 1277-79 (2004).
" Capers, Real Women, Real Rape, supra note 14, at 854-59.
'"8 Id. at 856.
18 See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
86 Even here, a victim's agency is often compromised, since it is the prosecutor who
will determine how she is "presented" to the jury. See Capers, Real Women, Real Rape,
supra note 14, at 864 n.197; Corey Rayburn, To Catch a Sex Thief The Burden of Per-
formance in Rape and Sexual Assault Trials, 15 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 437, 459-65
(2006).
" On the difficulty of imagining adult men as rape victims, see Capers, Real Rape
Too, supra note 14, at 1260-78.
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sive,"'"l or a Hispanic woman is hot blooded, "wanton and promiscuous.""'
As I have written previously, rape shields are likely particularly ineffective
in cases involving black women, given the long history of associating black
women with sexual accessibility and with being "unrapeable."'" In short,
while rape shield rules may benefit some white women because jurors, told
nothing, will presume them to be "good girls," other victims are unlikely to
enjoy the same presumption.'
While I have discussed several of these problems in earlier work, there
is yet another problem that to date has not been attended to: rape shield
rules, in application, have created the odd result of courts adopting a "male
gaze"1 92 and casting women as sexual objects rather than recognizing them
as subjects. This becomes particularly apparent when one considers the ap-
plication of rape shield rules to modes of dress. The Advisory Committee
Notes make clear that Rule 412 is intended to extend to matters which "may
have a sexual connotation for the factfinder."l93 Courts have accordingly
excluded evidence of the complainant's mode of dress at the time of the
incident. 194 The intent behind excluding evidence of how the complainant
'8 Lisa C. Ikemoto, Male Fraud, 3 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 511, 519-20 (2000).
18 Darren Lenard Hutchinson, Ignoring the Sexualization of Race: Heteronormativ-
ity, Critical Race Theory and Anti-racist Politics, 47 BuFF. L. REV. 1, 89 (1999).
" Capers, The Unintentional Rapist, supra note 99, at 1368; Capers, Real Women,
Real Rape, supra note 14, at 865-71; see also Darci E. Burrell, Recent Developments:
Myth, Stereotype, and the Rape of Black Women, 4 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 87, 89 (1993);
Elizabeth M. Iglesias, Rape, Race, and Representation: The Power of Discourse, Dis-
courses of Power, and the Reconstruction of Heterosexuality, 49 VAND. L. REV. 869, 874
n.9 (1996).
'9' It should be noted that for years, black women were largely invisible in media
discussions about rape, even though evidence suggests black women face higher victimi-
zation rates that white women. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATIsTIcs,
CRIMINAL VICTIMIZATION, 2010, NCJ 235508 (Sept. 2011). The attention the media paid
to the white victim in the Central Park jogger case, for example, is telling. In fact, there
were 3,254 other reported rapes in New York that year, "including one the following
week involving the near decapitation of a black woman in Fort Tryon Park and one two
weeks later involving a black woman in Brooklyn who was robbed, raped, sodomized,
and thrown down an airshaft of a four-story building." JOAN DIDION, AFTER HENRY 255
(1992). These rapes of women of color, however, remained invisible to the media. As I
wrote several years ago, it is relatively easy to summon the images of white female
victims. I. Bennett Capers, Crime, Legitimacy, and Testifying, 83 INo. L.J. 835, 855-56
(2008). Meanwhile, the only "black females who come to mind are Tawana Brawley and
the accuser in the Duke Lacrosse team rape case, both famously discredited as non-vic-
tims." Id. at 856 n.115. Now, the accuser in the Dominique Strauss-Kahn case would be
added to that list. See Capers, Real Woman, Real Rape, supra note 14, at 879-82.
92 Although the concept of a "male gaze" originated in film theory, see Laura Mul-
vey, Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema, ART AFTER MODERNIsM: RETHINKING REP-
RESENTATION 361, 366 (B. Wallis ed., 1988), the concept has crossed into feminist theory
more broadly to describe not only the pleasure male spectators receive in observing wo-
men, but also the notion that "the 'ideal' spectator is always assumed to be male and the
image of the woman is designed to flatter him." JoHN BERGER, WAYS OF SEEING 64
(1972).
193 FED. R. EvID. 412 advisory committee's note to 1994 amendment.
19 "Consequently ... evidence such as that relating to the alleged victim's mode of
dress, speech or life-style will not be admissible." Id.
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was dressed is certainly laudable-it puts to rest one of the most notorious
passages in the history of rape law, Judge Cowen's assertion in People v.
Abbot'95 that we "more readily infer assent in the practiced. Messalina, in
loose attire, than in the reserved and virtuous Lucretia[.]"'96 However, it is
also troubling insofar as it reinscribes the notion that dress, regardless of the
wearer's intention, signals sexuality, indeed sexual availability.' It protects
complainants, but at a cost. In protecting complainants-paradigmatically
perceived to be women in need of protection-Rule 412 adopts a perspective
reminiscent of the male gaze and, in doing so, re-objectifies women.' It
denies women self-determination.'" It tells women, Although you may think
you are dressing for yourself or for comfort, orforfashion, you are in fact
engaged in "sexual behavior," so we are excluding evidence of how you
dress.
Allow me to elaborate on this last point. It is now familiar to hear wo-
men assert that they should be able to dress in ways that are sexual without
risking assault and without being accused of "asking for it." There is even a
SlutWalk movement. As Deborah Tuerkheimer has written, the SlutWalk
movement takes "aim at rape while expressly promoting the virtues of fe-
male sexuality," and in doing so "situates itself where anti-rape and pro-sex
norms converge."2 " Tuerkheimer argues that incorporating sex-positivity
1 19 Wend.192 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1838).
19 Id. at 195.
'9 To be sure, dress is a signal. As one commentator has observed in her discussion
of the semiotic system of dress, "dress makes a sign that describes the wearer, and the
wearer uses dress to make a sign." Alinor C. Sterling, Undressing the Victim: The Inter-
section of Evidentiary and Semiotic Meanings of Women's Clothing in Rape Trials, 7
YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 87, 91 (1995). Roland Barthes has described dress as a kind of
writing. See ROLAND BARTHEs, The Disease of Costume, CRITICAL ESSAYs 41, 49 (Rich-
ard Howards trans., 1972). Or, as I have written, dress "is communication" with "its own
syntax and grammar." I. Bennett Capers, Cross Dressing and the Criminal, 20 YALE J.L.
& HUMAN. 1, 6 (2008). The point here is not about the wearer using dress as a signal-
for example, one of the erotic female autonomy that Duncan Kennedy famously explored.
See DUNCAN KENNEDY, SEXY DRESSING (1993). Rather, the point here is about the spec-
tator seeing the dress as a signal, even where no such signal is intended, or where a signal
is intended for a different audience. The concern, as such, is about misreadings and
usurped readings.
'9 Catherine MacKinnon's observation bears repeating: "Woman through male eyes
is [a] sex object, that by which man knows himself at once as [a] man and as [a]
subject." CATHERINE A. MACKINNON, ToWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 122
(1989).
'" This is not the only place where Rule 412 allows judges to unilaterally categorize
something as "sexual behavior" which, to the victim, may not be sexual at all. The most
extreme example is evidence that the complainant was a prior victim of rape, which
courts have categorized as "prior sexual behavior" and thus covered by Rule 412. See
United States v. Nez, 661 F.2d 1203, 1205-06 (10th Cir. 1981) (holding that evidence
that complainant had been raped twice before falls under Rule 412's prohibition); State v.
Muyingo, 15 P.3d 83, 87 (Or. Ct. App. 2000) (holding that prior sexual victimization is
prior sexual behavior for purposes of rape shield rule). A more.prudent decision would
have been to exclude such evidence under Rule 401.
2
" See Deborah Tuerkheimer, Slutwalking in the Shadow of the Law, 98 MINN. L.
REV. 1453, 1455-56 (2014).
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into rape law can lead to better rape laws and greater sexual agency. 201 My
concern also focuses on greater sexual agency, but from a different direction.
My concern is not just with women who want to dress in a manner that may
be sexual but also with those women who dress in ways that they think are
not sexual at all. Consider a woman who wears a skirt to work-assume she
works at a law firm where skirts are "business professional" attire for asso-
ciates. Assume too that, working late one evening, she is sexually assaulted
by a co-worker. At trial, the judge bars all reference to the woman's skirt,
make-up, and heels for fear that the jurors will consider her dress sexual
behavior. While this might remove dress from jurors' minds-again, class
and race assumptions will likely impact what style of dress jurors imagine
when they are told nothing-it will do so in a way that is anything but cost-
free. The woman, after all, will likely not be asked whether references to her
clothing should be excluded. Usually, at the request of the prosecutor, they
simply are. This state of affairs may be particularly troubling for women
who believed they were only dressing for themselves. If the expressive mes-
sage is, No, you were engaged in sexy dressing, then the expressive message
must also be, To a certain extent, you participated in your own sexual objec-
tification by dressing as you did. Imagine how a complainant might internal-
ize this.2 02 Do we really want complainants thinking, I guess I shouldn't have
worn a skirt, or heels, or lipstick?
To be clear, I am not suggesting that this always happens. Nor am I
suggesting that the benefits to excluding evidence of dress do not outweigh
the costs. What I am suggesting is that we should not blind ourselves to the
costs of judicially re-dressing women and of communicating to women
whose agency has been denied once that their agency is being denied again,
this time by a judge. We should consider ways to minimize the costs. For
example, rather than judges-still mostly male 20 3-banning all evidence of
every complainant's dress on the ground that it might be deemed sexual be-
havior, imagine a judge instead delivering an instruction to the jury. Imagine
a judge instructing jurors: "In a society predicated on freedom, everyone
enjoys freedom of dress. The law protects every person from unwanted sex
and does so equally, whether that person is wearing a skirt or a business suit,
heels or flats, lipstick or nothing at all."
201 See id. at 1458.
202 As Anne Coughlin has argued, we should pay more attention to how prosecutorial
tactics and expressive messages may conflict with female agency and feminist goals.
Anne M. Coughlin, Interrogation Stories, 95 VA. L. REv. 1599, 1605 (2009). Coughlin
focuses on scripts used to interrogate and secure confessions from suspected rapists-
scripts which seductively but problematically encourage suspects to blame the victim. Id.
Something similar is at stake with Rule 412 when the state "protects" the victim by re-
objectifying and re-sexualizing her.
203 See Malia Reddick et al., Racial and Gender Diversity on State Courts, 48
JuiGs' J. 28, 30 tbl. 1 (2009) (finding percentage of female judges ranges from 33.5% in
Florida to 5.6% in West Virginia).
212 [Vol. 40
Rape, Truth, and Hearsay
Imagine, too, how agency-enhancing it would be if the decision regard-
ing the admissibility of how the complainant was dressed rested not unilater-
ally with the judge or the prosecutor, but also took into consideration the
wishes of the complainant.
As the foregoing should make clear, if we are truly concerned about
retiring retrograde notions of demure women in need of protection, then rape
shields, which paradigmatically assume a female victim, have much to an-
swer for. Rape shields-and again, there is some good in them-bear troub-
ling similarities with Victorian notions that there are certain things that a
woman does not discuss. That there are things that should not be said in
polite (read female) company. That just as a woman should never be asked
her age, she should certainly never be asked about her sexual history. In
other words, it is true that rape shield laws, at least when they are strictly
applied, function as shields, but we must also acknowledge another truth:
that they simultaneously function as corsets and chastity belts. Certainly
there is something paternalistic, or, as I have more recently argued,
maternalistic,2 04 about this approach.
I have largely been arguing that rape shield rules are problematic be-
cause, in excluding sexual history evidence, they in fact communicate that
sexual history does matter. They communicate that jurors should assume the
complainant is chaste, is a "good girl," is someone deserving of the law's
protection. Rape shields do not subvert the common law's chastity require-
ment; instead, they reinscribe it in a different form. However, this does not
have to be the case. This troubling expressive message could be countered
with a different instruction. I have suggested in earlier work that courts
should instruct jurors as follows:
Everyone deserves to have the criminal law vindicate them when
they have been raped, regardless of their sexual history. Engaging
in sexual behavior, whether it be once or innumerable times, does
not render a person outside of the law's protection. Everyone is
entitled to sexual autonomy, and no one, by merely engaging in
sex, assumes the risk of subsequent rape. Put differently, before
the law, it does not matter whether a complainant is a virgin or
sexually active. Before the law, everyone is entitled to legal re-
spect, regardless of his or her sexual past.205 Accordingly, [al-
though you may hear evidence of the complainant's sexual history
in this case,] bear in mind that in this case and in all rape cases, all
rape victims are entitled to the law's protection.206
204 1. Bennett Capers, On "Violence Against Women," 13 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 347,
356 (2016).
205 This instruction borrows heavily from Michelle Anderson's normative vision of
rape law. See Anderson, supra note 153, at 55.
206 Capers, Real Women, Real Rape, supra note 14, at 872.
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Such an instruction has the potential to counter rape shield's troubling ex-
pressive message that jurors should assume the complainant is chaste and
good. Such an instruction decouples protection from sexual history, making
it clear that everyone is entitled to sexual agency without judgment.207 To the
extent rape shields are sex-negative, such an instruction is the very opposite:
sex-positive.
There is another point to be made about the two instructions I have now
offered, and that is this: these instructions can a play a role in changing the
culture. If, as Alexis de Tocqueville argued, serving on a jury is an education
and one way we learn about good citizenship, then we should use that oppor-
tunity to teach citizens that everyone is entitled to equal respect and equal
protection and everyone has the right to sexual agency.
I would be remiss if I did not at least note one other problem with rape
shields. Rape shield rules seem outdated when applied to the cases that mat-
ter most now. Rape shield rules were enacted at a time when it was espe-
cially difficult to secure a conviction even in stranger rape cases, and the
pressing issue was proving that a defendant engaged in sexual intercourse
without consent and by force, the standard definition of rape. Due in part to
the reforms urged by feminists-eliminating the corroboration requirement,
abolishing or at least limiting the resistance requirement, and repealing the
marital immunity rule, to name a few-we are now in another era. Just con-
sider: the terms "date rape" and "acquaintance rape," now part of the popu-
lar lexicon, entered the conversation in the early 1980s,208 after rape shield
rules were enacted. It was only in the 1980s that society began to acknowl-
edge that sexual assault by intimates was also "real rape," to borrow from
Susan Estrich's phrasing. 209 Now, "it is acquaintance rape that is in the
zeitgeist" and that has become the most pervasive danger,210 and with this
change has come a different legal issue in rendering rape judgments. Now, at
a time when force is no longer required for many rape prosecutions, there is
often the issue of whether the defendant was mistaken-in short, whether
the defendant honestly and reasonably believed there was consent. Rule 412
and its state cognates largely predate this change 2 11 and they have proved an
odd fit indeed.
207 As Julia Simon-Kerr has noted, there is a long history of associating a woman's
worth and goodness, including her honesty, with her chastity. See generally Julia Simon-
Kerr, Note, Unchaste and Incredible: The Use of Gendered Conceptions of Honor in
Impeachment, 117 YALE L.J. 1854 (2008); Julia Simon-Kerr, Credibility by Proxy, 85
GEO. WASH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2016).
208 The entry of the term "date rape" in English-language books can be seen in a
Google ngram using the search term "date rape." See Ngram Viewer, GOOGLE BOOKS,
https://books.google.com/ngrams (graph the words "date rape").
21 SUSAN ESTRICH, REAL RAPE: HOW THE LEGAL SYSTEM VIcrIMIZEs WOMEN WHO
SAY No 3 (1987).
210 Deborah Tuerkheimer, Rape On and Off Campus, 65 EMORY L.J. 1, 2 (2015).
211 Joshua Dressier, Where We Have Been, and Where We Might Be Going: Some
Cautionary Reflections on Rape Law Reform, 46 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 409, 431 (1998)
("Before rape law reform, the issue of mens rea rarely arose in rape trials.").
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Using Stephens v. Miller to re-conceptualize rape shield rules cannot
address all of these issues, but it can address some.
IV. RETHINKING RAPE SHIELDS
As the foregoing should make clear, rape shields remain deeply prob-
lematic. They are imperfect and send messages that, upon close inspection,
reveal themselves to be retrograde rather than progressive, sex negative
rather than sex positive. While they may benefit some women-women who
because of race or class can easily fit the script of ideal, "good" victims-it
is unlikely that this benefit extends to other individuals who do not fit the
ideal victim script. For these victims, jurors who are told nothing likely turn
to pre-conceived stereotypes that may be diametrically at odds with rape
shields' intended message.
Given these problems and the often opposing goals of victim advocates
and defense lawyers, it may very well be impossible to fashion a rape shield
rule that satisfies everyone. That said, they can certainly be improved, and
they can be applied so that they restore to juries the power to decide crucial
facts, especially in cases where the probative value of evidence is strong and
the risk of unfair prejudice has been minimized. Stephens v. Miller can point
the way out of two of the major, recurring problems with rape shield laws:
their sometimes overbreadth and their inconsistency with our intuitions
about the right judgments.212 My argument is radical in its simplicity. Radi-
cal, because rape shields have governed rape trials for some forty-five years,
excluding evidence in literally tens of thousands of rape trials, without such
an intervention. Simple, because the solution does not require a major re-
working of rape shield rules. In theory, the language of the Federal Rape
Shield, Rule 412, need not be changed at all, though I do recommend a
change for the sake of clarity. The solution does not "go far to seek disquie-
tude."213 Instead, the solution, which gets us closer to the law ought, comes
from another part of the Rules of Evidence. The solution comes from the
part governing hearsay.
Recall the effect of the rape shield in Stephens v. Miller. At bottom, the
evidence Stephens sought to introduce, and which the en banc court held
was properly excluded under Indiana's rape shield provision, constituted
nothing more than words. Because Stephens' words seemed to reference the
complainant's past sexual behavior and sexual predisposition-" [d]on't you
like it like this . . . Tim Hall said you did" and that she enjoyed "switching
212 Again, by "right judgment," I am not referring to a particular verdict, guilty or not
guilty. Rather, I am referring to a judgment that gives us the sense that crucial evidence
was decided by a jury and that the jury considered all relevant and non-prejudicial evi-
dence. It is this type of "right judgment" that is consistent with the role of the jury,
legitimacy, and community acceptance.
213 WILLIAM WORDSWORTH, PRELUDE, Book Five, v.51-52 (1805).
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partners" 214 -the en banc court deemed his words as falling within the scope
of Indiana's rape shield rule. Nor was the plurality decision alone in conclud-
ing that Stephens's proffered evidence was sexual predisposition evidence
within the meaning of Indiana's rape shield rule; every court that considered
Stephens's case assumed that the evidence Stephens sought to introduce-
again, his words-amounted to sexual history evidence and thus was pre-
sumptively barred under the rape shield rule. Faced with the first such ruling,
from the judge who presided over Stephens's trial, Stephens was compelled
to turn to the only option the trial judge provided: Stephens testified that he
said "something" to the woman. 2 15 Stephens testified that this "something"
angered the woman, leading her to retroactively withdraw her consent and
claim that she had been raped.216 This claim, predicated on Stephens's vague
"I said something," certainly did not persuade the jury, and likely hurt his
defense for the reasons I have already articulated. 2 17 They returned a verdict
of guilty, and the judge imposed a sentence of twenty years.
However, something curious emerges if we bracket the rape shield rule
for a moment and return to Stephens's original words: Freed from the
shadow of the rape shield rule, the evidentiary significance of Stephens's
out-of-court statements would turn on their relevancy and their reliability. In
short, the question would no longer be, "Do these out-of-court statements
violate the rape shield rule?" Rather, the evidentiary question would be,
"Are the statements relevant and would admission of the statements, since
they were made out of court, violate the ban against hearsay?"
As to the first question, the statements clearly added support to Ste-
phens's defense theory that the complainant fabricated the rape charge after
consensual sex because she was angered that others had been talking about
her sexual history. As the dissenting judges pointed out in the en banc opin-
ion, the statements were "a cornerstone of Stephens' case." 218 The dissenting
judges added:
The plausibility of Stephens' defense turned in substantial part on
whether the jury could be persuaded that something Stephens had
said to the complainant could have so enraged her that she would
have responded in the manner he alleged. Central to Stephens' case
then are the words he claims to have said that night, words the jury
never heard. 2 19
214 Stephens v. Miller, 13 F.3d 998, 1000 (7th Cir. 1994) (en banc).2 1 5 Id. at 1001.
2 1 6 Id.
217 See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
218 Stephens v. Miller, 13 F.3d at 1009 (Cummings, J., dissenting).219 Id. at 1010.
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It seems beyond dispute that the statements were clearly relevant to the
defense, given relevancy's "any tendency" standard and the lenient test of
probativeness. 2 20
Now consider the second question: are Stephens's statements reliable?
Or to put this in evidentiary terms, should we be concerned that his state-
ments contain hearsay, which is defined as an out of court statement offered
"in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted in the statement"?221
Clearly all of Stephens's statements were "out of court." He offered to re-
peat what he said the night of March 17, 1987, and even a trial witness's own
statements are included in the hearsay ban. 222 Stephens's statements, or at
least a portion of them, seem to also satisfy the second definitional require-
ment of hearsay: 223 they include a communicative assertion. Stephens was
arguably communicating something to the woman.224 "Don't you like it like
this? . . .Tim Hall said you did." 225 Indeed, upon closer inspection, Ste-
phens's statement that the woman liked sex a particular way and enjoyed
switching partners, according to Tim Hall, involved two levels of potential
hearsay. Stephens's proposed testimony at trial would have included not only
Stephens quoting himself, but also quoting Tim Hall. In short, Stephens
wanted to testify at trial words to the effect, "I told the woman, 'You like it
like that, don't you.' I also told the woman, 'Tim Hall told me you like it this
way and that you enjoy switching partners."' What renders Stephens's state-
ments non-hearsay is their failure to satisfy the third requirement: hearsay
only applies to statements that are offered for the truth of the matter the
declarant intended to assert.226 Here, Stephens's statements were not offered
at trial for their truth. Instead, he offered them for another purpose entirely.
An illustration may be useful. Consider an example in which a husband
comes home to find his wife despondent. She calmly tells him, "My ex-
boyfriend showed up here and hit me." The statement would be inadmissible
at trial to prove that the woman's ex-boyfriend did in fact show up and hit
her. However, assume the husband responds to the news by tracking down
the ex-boyfriend and shooting him, and that the husband himself now faces
220 FED. R. EVID. 40 1(a); see also id. advisory committee's note to 1972 rules ("The
standard of probability under the rule is "more probable than it would be without the
evidence.")
221 FED. R. EvID. 801(c).
222 FED. R. EvID. 801 advisory committee's notes on proposed rules (observing that
its decision to include a witness's own past statements within the ambit of hearsay was
"one more of experience than of logic.")
223 One could argue that the first part of Stephens's statement, "You like it like this,"
is not communicative at all since presumably the woman already knew how she enjoyed
sex. However, a fairer reading would be that Stephens is essentially saying, "I know you
like it like this." That information would be communicative.
224 Of course, even if Stephens's statements were non-assertive, the end result would
remain the same: the statements would be non-hearsay, and thus not barred by the rule
against hearsay.
2" Stephens v. Miller, 13 F.3d 998, 1000 (7th Cir. 1994) (en banc).
226 FED. R. EvID. 801(c)(2).
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homicide charges. Now, the statement is admissible, although still not for its
truth. Rather, it is admissible for the non-truth purpose to show the effect the
words had on him, and thus support a provocation defense.
Viewed as a hearsay issue, it becomes apparent that Stephens was not
offering his out of court statement, or the statement he repeated from Tim
Hall, to prove that the woman liked sex in a particular position or enjoyed
switching partners. For starters, it is hard to imagine such information being
relevant to the issue of consent. Nor was Stephens offering the statements to
prove that he believed the woman liked sex in a particular position or
switching partners. It is hard to imagine this being relevant either. The crux
of Stephens's defense in no way turned on the substantive truth of what he
was saying. This becomes clear by engaging in an evidentiary thought exer-
cise. If Tim Hall later told Stephens, "I was just joshing you, I was only
joking," Stephens would still want to repeat his statements in court. He
would want to repeat them not because he is offering them for their truth-
he might even be willing to stipulate that he later learned his friend was
joking-but to contextualize and explain his claim of why she responded as
she did. Quite simply, Stephens was not offering these statements for their
truth, but in classic non-hearsay fashion, to show the effect on the listener
and to explain why the woman may have been motivated to react in anger,
terminate her consent, order him to leave, and falsely accuse him of rape.227
The ban against hearsay would present no bar to its admissibility. 228 The
jurors could still dismiss Stephens's testimony as not-credible, but the jurors
would at least hear his testimony. They would base their decision on more
evidence, rather than less, and on specific, concrete statements rather than
the vague and difficult-to-credit "something" pressed upon Stephens by the
trial judge.
Focusing on the non-hearsay nature of the contested evidence and the
issue of what the evidence is being offered for-that Stephens was not offer-
ing his statements for their truth-suggests a way out of a recurring problem
in applying rape shield rules. Each court that considered Stephens's case
deemed his statements as falling within the scope of Indiana's rape shield
cognate to Rule 412 of the Federal Rules of Evidence because of a sequen-
tial error. Rather than first asking whether Stephens's proffered testimony
227 To be sure, Stephens's defense would be enhanced if his assertions were true.
Were they false, the woman might have been more likely to react in confusion. If true,
however, the woman might be indignant that her sex life had been made public-perhaps
indignant enough to want to retaliate by withdrawing consent and accusing Stephens of
rape. (Credit is due to George Fisher for urging me to consider this possibility). But while
the truth of Stephens's statement would buttress his defense, the truth is not necessary to
it. Again, the judge can instruct jurors to not consider the statement as true. The judge
might even require Stephens to so stipulate.
228 The sole remaining issue would be to balance its probative value against the risk
of undue prejudice, but here, too, it would likely survive admission. The probative value
is high, and any risk that jurors would misuse the evidence say, for its truth, can be
tempered the usual way, with a limiting instruction from the court pursuant to FED. R.
EVID. 105.
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was relevant and trustworthy (since they consisted of out of court state-
ments), the courts immediately turned to whether the statements violated the
rape shield rule as "evidence of the victim's past sexual conduct." 229 Be-
cause of this sequential error, the courts assumed that Stephens was in fact
offering the evidence to prove the "victim's past sexual conduct." Had the
courts first asked the relevancy and trustworthiness questions, or at least
asked them at some point, the courts might have realized that the trustwor-
thiness/hearsay analysis provides a way to apply rape shield rules in a way
that seems fairer, more consistent with a defendant's constitutional right to
present a defense, and more consistent with allowing jurors to decide issues
of fact to reach the right judgment, whether that be a judgment of guilty or
not guilty. 230 Put differently, the distinction between evidence offered for its
truth and evidence offered for some other reason-the same test for distin-
guishing hearsay from non-hearsay-could have presented the trial judge in
Stephens v. Miller, and judges in numerous other sexual assault cases, a way
to rethink rape shield rules and avoid overbreadth. It makes some sense that
rape shields would bar evidence of a victim's past sexual conduct if offered
for its truth. It makes less sense that rape shields should also bar evidence
not offered for its truth at all, but for some other non-truth reason. This is the
approach taken by Rule 412 in another context, that of prior false accusa-
tions of rape. Courts treat such prior accusations as outside of Rule 412's
prohibition of sexual history evidence in part because false accusations are
not "sexual conduct," but also in part because they are not offered for their
truth, but instead for their very falsity to consider in judging the credibility
of the complainant. 231
This is what I mean when I suggest Stephens v. Miller presented a
missed opportunity. Had the courts proceeded in a different sequence, or at
least thought seriously at some point about whether Stephens was offering
evidence for its truth, the plurality could have reached a very different deci-
sion that would have served as a model for other courts to rethink the appli-
cability of rape shield rules. More specifically, the plurality could have ruled
that since such evidence was not being offered for its truth, the rape shield
rule had no applicability at all. Such non-truth evidence certainly avoids the
risk of embarrassment or invading the victim's privacy that in part motivated
the widespread passage of rape shield laws. Thus, the question would simply
be one of weighing the relevancy against the risk of unfair prejudice. The
plurality could have suggested a limiting instruction that sexual evidence
229 IND. CODE § 35-37-4-4 (2016).
230 This is not the only route by which the defense may have been able to admit
Stephens's statements. The defense could also have argued that admission was warranted
under Olden v. Kentucky, which held that it is a violation of a defendant's Sixth Amend-
ment right to confront witnesses to prohibit him from cross-examining his accuser to
show "a prototypical form of bias." 488 U.S. 227, 231 (1988).
231 See, e.g., State v. Smith, 743 So.2d 199, 202-23 (La. 1999); see also FED. R.
EVID. 412 advisory committee's note to 1994 amendment ("Evidence offered to prove
allegedly false prior claims by the victim is not barred by Rule 412.").
2017] 219
Harvard Journal of Law & Gender
would be admissible where it is relevant and used for non-truth purposes. In
short, the plurality could have pointed the way to a better application of rape
shield rules.
Thus far, I have been suggesting that improving rape shields to mini-
mize two of their most pressing problems-overbreadth and the sense that
they are often out of step with the our sense of who should be deciding
crucial facts-could have been accomplished had the en banc court simply
interpreted the rape shield's application as limited to sexual history evidence
offered for its truth. The language of Indiana's rape shield rule,232 and even
more so the federal rape shield rule, 233 already lends itself to such a reading.
Such a ruling could have inspired other courts to similarly apply rape shields
in a more judicious fashion. That said, to further clarify how and when rape
shields should be applied, one could imagine a simple amendment to the
rule. For example, the federal rape shield rule could be amended, in relevant
part, as follows:
The following evidence is not admissible in a civil or criminal proceed-
ing involving alleged sexual misconduct:
(a) Evidence offered to prove a claim that a victim in fact engaged
in other sexual behavior; or
(b) Evidence offered to prove a claim that a victim in fact had a
sexual predisposition. 23 4
232 In relevant part, Indiana's rape shield provides:
Sec. 4. (a) In a prosecution for a sex crime as defined in IC 35-42-4:
(1) evidence of the victim's past sexual conduct;
(2) evidence of the past sexual conduct of a witness other than the
accused;
(3) opinion evidence of the victim's past sexual conduct;
(4) opinion evidence of the past sexual conduct of a witness other than
the accused;
(5) reputation evidence of the victim's past sexual conduct; and
(6) reputation evidence of the past sexual conduct of a witness other than
the accused;
may not be admitted, nor may reference be made to this evidence in the presence
of the jury, except as provided in this chapter.
IND. CODE § 35-37-4-4 (2016).
233 In relevant part, the federal rape shield rule applies to "evidence offered to prove
that a victim engaged in other sexual behavior; or ... to prove a victim's sexual predispo-
sition." FED. R. Evio. 412(a).
234 It could be argued that such an amendment should be unnecessary for the federal
rape shield rule because it already specifies that it bars evidence "offered to prove" that a
victim engaged in other sexual conduct or a victim's sexual predisposition. FED. R. EvID.
412. Indeed, one of the dissenters in Stephens v. Miller made this argument. 13 F.3d 998,
1012 (7th Cir. 1994) (en banc) (Cudahy, J., dissenting) ("The testimony that Stephens
sought to offer, however, neither sought to prove the victim's character nor was intended
to address the question of consent. Rather than attempting to prove the truth of any matter
about Wilburn's character, Stephens ostensibly wanted to offer his story to show its effect
on the listener."). At least one other court, albeit in dicta, made a similar distinction. See
People v. Jovanovic, 700 N.Y.S.2d 156, 166 (Sup. Ct. App. Div. 1999) (noting that "a
statement may be relevant as proof of the speaker's, or the listener's, state of mind" rather
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Thus, in situations where a defendant is offering evidence of a sexual
nature, the court would analyze the evidentiary issue sequentially, first turn-
ing to relevancy and trustworthiness under the traditional hearsay rules
before turning to the rape shield. If the trial court determines that the party is
not offering the evidence for its truth but for some other, non-truth reason,
Rule 412 itself would not bar its admission. Rather, the trial court would
engage in the normal probative value versus unfair prejudice balancing test
that applies to all evidence. Where, after conducting a balancing test, a court
admits sexual evidence relating to a complainant for a non-truth purpose, the
court, pursuant to Rule 105, can instruct the jury how such evidence can be
used in order to minimize any risk of unfair prejudice. 23 5 For example, in
Stephens v. Miller, the en banc court could have recommended an instruc-
tion along the following lines:
You have heard evidence that the defendant made a statement to
the complainant to the effect that he had heard she liked sex a
particular way. This statement was certainly not offered to show
consent. It has no bearing on that issue at all, and as such you may
not consider it on the issue of consent. Nor was it offered for its
truth, i.e., that she liked sex a particular way. Indeed, you may
even assume the substance of the statement to be false. Rather, I
allowed the statement for a limited purpose: so that you, as finders
of fact, can decide whether the defendant in fact made the state-
ment, and if so, whether such a statement, regardless of its truth or
than to prove the truth of the matter). However, the Advisory Committee Notes suggest
that the rule was not intended to be so limited. The Advisory Committee Notes provide
simply that Rule 412 bars
evidence relating to the alleged victim's sexual behavior or alleged sexual predis-
position, whether offered as substantive evidence or for impeachment, except in
designated circumstances in which the probative value of the evidence signifi-
cantly outweighs the possible harm to the victim.
FED. R. EvID. 412 advisory committee's notes to 1994 amendment. Treatises take a simi-
lar view. See, e.g., MEULLER & KIRKPATRICK, EVIDENCE, § 4.32 (5th ed. 2012) ("FRE
412(a) imposes a general prohibition against evidence of an alleged victim's 'other sexual
behavior' or 'sexual predisposition."'). Nor have most courts interpreted the rule as so
limited. See, e.g., United States v. Knox, No. ACM 28628, 1992 WL 97157 (A.F.C.M.R.
Apr. 20, 1992) (interpreting MiL.R.EvID. 412 as extending its prohibition to evidence
offered not for its truth, but to show the belief of the defendant); United States v. Torres,
937 F.2d 1469, 1471-72 (9th Cir. 1991); United States v. Duran, 886 F.2d 167, 168 n.3
(8th Cir. 1989). The one federal appellate decision to read Rule 412 as not barring evi-
dence to show the defendant's reasonable belief-Doe v. United States, 666 F.2d 43 (4th
Cir. 1981)-was roundly criticized on the ground that the court was reading a non-ex-
isting exception into Rule 412's flat prohibition. See, e.g., Robert G. Spector & Teree E.
Foster, Rule 412 and the Doe Case: The Fourth Circuit Turns Back the Clock, 35 OKLA.
L. REV. 87, 96-97 (1982). The Fourth Circuit later retreated from its decision. See United
States v. Saunders, 943 F.2d 388 (4th Cir. 1991) (interpreting Rule 412 to cover evidence
offered not for its truth, but to show the belief of the defendant).
235 See FED. R. Evio. 105 ("[T]he court, on timely request, must restrict the evidence
to its proper scope and instruct the jury accordingly.").
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falsity, might have so angered the complainant that it motivated
her to falsely accuse the defendant of attempted rape.
My suggestion of a yet another jury instruction-this is the third so
far-is sure to give some critics pause, but it should not. Although the Court
has repeatedly insisted that jurors are presumed to follow instructions, 236
scholars have been skeptical. 237 However, growing evidence suggests that
instructions do work under the right conditions, especially when those in-
structions are explained and repeated throughout the trial. 238 Add to this the
following: to the extent the parties are concerned that some jurors will be
unable to follow instructions, these jurors can be removed during voir dire
for cause. Lastly, turning back to the trial itself, the trial court has the author-
ity to condition the admissibility of non-truth evidence on the defendant con-
ceding, in front of the jury, that the substance of the evidence is or may be
false.239
Ideally, this proposed modification to rape shield rules would have
broad application beyond the singular facts of Stephens v. Miller. For start-
ers, the proposed modification would simplify cases like United States v.
Pumpkin Seed.2 4 In Pumpkin Seed, the defendant claimed that he was in the
process of engaging in consensual sex with the complainant when they were
spied by several neighborhood boys. The defendant told the boys to go away
because he was "trying to get some" from a "minor bunner," a derogatory
term for a promiscuous woman.2 41 According to the defendant, the complain-
ant responded to his characterization of her by cursing the defendant and
claiming rape. 2 4 2 Assuming the defendant sought to offer his characterization
of her as a "minor bunner" not for its truth, but rather to show its effect on
the complainant and thus explain her possible motivation for claiming rape,
his statements would not be barred by the proposed, modified rape shield
rule. Rather, the judge would conduct a probative value versus unfair
prejudice balancing test to determine its admissibility, could condition ad-
missibility on the defendant explaining to the jury that he had no basis for
236 See, e.g., Weeks v. Angelone, 528 U.S. 225, 234 (2000); Richardson v. Marsh,
481 U.S. 200, 211 (1987).
237 See, e.g., David Alan Sklansky, Evidentiary Instructions and the Jury as Other, 65
STAN. L. REV. 407, 409-10 (2013).
238 Id.; see also Neil P. Cohen, The Timing of Jury Instructions, 67 TENN. L. REV.
681, 681 (2000) (arguing "that jury instructions should be given whenever they would
facilitate the sound administration of the jury or would assist the jury in carrying out its
twin duties of finding the facts and applying the relevant legal principles to those facts.").
239 See FED. R. EvrD. 102 (directing courts to construe rules to secure the fair admin-
istration of justice); United States v. Jackson, 405 F. Supp. 938, 943 (E.D.N.Y. 1975)
(reading Rule 102 as permitting courts to "interpret the Rules creatively so as to promote
growth and development in the law of evidence in the interests of justice and reliable
fact-finding").
240 572 F.3d 552 (8th Cir. 2009).
241 More specifically, the term describes a woman who "has a proclivity for engaging
in sexual activities with adolescent males." Id. at 555 n.2.
242 Id. at 555.
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his characterization of the woman, and would instruct the jury that the defen-
dant's own statements were not being offered for their truth but merely to
explain why the complainant may have responded as the defendant claims.
Two points are worth emphasizing. First, to the extent the defendant in fact
cares about the truth, these conditions may very well serve as a clearing
device and prompt him to withdraw his proffer since the jury will be unable
to use the evidence as he had hoped. Second, and more importantly, should
the defendant agree to offer this evidence on these conditions, there is noth-
ing in this proposal that requires the jurors to credit the defendant. The pros-
ecution would be free, through its direct examination of the complainant and
cross-examination of the defendant, to establish that such statement was
never made, or that if it was made, it did not have the "fabricating" influ-
ence the defendant claims. The ultimate decision of whether to credit the
defendant or not, and whether to accept his theory of the case or not, would
be with the jurors. This is what justice looks like. This is what I mean by the
right judgment.
Perhaps most significantly, this proposal would also apply to a category
of sexual assault cases that are far more typical, such as acquaintance rape
cases in which a defendant claims reasonable mistake of fact, specifically
that he mistakenly but reasonably believed the complainant had consented.2 43
A hypothetical reasonable mistake-of-fact case, as an illustration, may be
helpful: Imagine a boy and girl meet on Tinder. Boy and girl engage in
sexually flirtatious texts before meeting in person at a Hurrah for the Riff
Raff concert. Afterwards, he invites her to his apartment to "Netflix and
chill." In the apartment, when he begins kissing her, she kisses back, and
when he begins undressing her, she does not protest. He proceeds to engage
in sexual intercourse. In this hypothetical, which may bring to mind cases
that are staples in criminal law casebooks such as People v. Jovanovic2" and
State v. Rusk,245 the possibility of reasonable mistake lies just beneath the
surface.246 It is possible that from his perspective, knowing that "Netflix and
243 Importantly, consent can be expressed verbally or non-verbally. For example, the
pending draft of the revised Model Penal Code criminalizes penetration without consent,
but permits that "consent may be expressed or it may be inferred from behavior" such as
"words and conduct-both action and inaction-in the context of all the circumstances."
See MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.0(3) (AM. LAW. INST., Tentative Draft No. 2, 2016).
24700 N.Y.S.2d 156, 164-75 (N.Y. App. Div. 1999) (involving college students
who met online and joked about S&M online, with the complainant describing herself as
a masochist and "pushy bottom," before meeting in person; the defendant, after inviting
her back to his room, tied her up and over the course of twenty hours dropped hot candle
wax on her skin and molested her with a baton.).
245 289 Md. 230, 234 (1981) (involving a complainant who met a guy at a bar, agreed
to give him a lift home, and became afraid when he began badgering her to come up to
his apartment, where he removed her clothes; afraid, in part because of "the look in his
eyes," she did not physically resist when he engaged in sexual activity).
246 Because of the difficulty of proving sexual assault, some scholars have argued that
we should disallow the reasonable mistake defense in sexual assault cases. See, e.g.,
Susan Estrich, Rape, 95 YALE L.J. 1087, 1102 (1986) ("My view is that such a 'negligent
rapist should be punished, albeit-as in murder-less severely than the man who acts
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chill" is slang for a sexual hookup,2 47 her subsequent behavior was consis-
tent with consent. But it is also entirely possible that from her perspective,
thinking that "Netflix and chill" literally meant watching Netflix and re-
laxing, and then experiencing frozen fright, this was non-consensual sex.
The law, in many jurisdictions, will allow the defendant to make the ele-
ment-negating claim that he lacked the requisite mens rea to be guilty of
sexual assault, because he honestly and reasonably believed that consent had
been expressed.
The rule modification I am proposing would assist triers of fact in those
situations in which a defendant seeks to offer out-of-court statements to ex-
plain the basis for his mistaken belief that he had received consent. Let me
say up front that the point of this proposal is not to help defendants avoid
justice. Far from it. Rather, the goal is to assist jurors in reaching a just result
to the best of their ability, whether their verdict is one of guilty or not guilty.
Consider a few possibilities, but for now try to withhold judgment. I am not
asking the reader to like these defendants. But I am asking the reader to keep
an open mind about whether these defendants are deserving of the law's
violence.2 48 First, consider a variation of the case Commonwealth v.
Berkowitz.2 49 The defendant and complainant, both college students, had at-
tended the same ""Does 'no' sometimes means 'yes'?" school seminar two
weeks earlier, and after the seminar the complainant told a group of friends,
in Berkowitz's presence, what she liked in penis size. The complainant later
showed up at his dorm room stating that she was looking for her boyfriend,
agreed to hang out for a bit when she realized her boyfriend was not there,
and did not physically resist when Berkowitz kissed her, fondled her, and
straddled her on the bed. Assume she later accuses Berkowitz of rape. Recal-
ling her earlier statement about what she liked in penis size, Berkowitz, in-
voking a mistake of fact defense, might argue that he reasonably believed
the totality of her actions constituted consent.
Or consider the facts of United States v. Sanchez,2 0 in which the defen-
dant, who had previously heard that the complainant would often invite ser-
with purpose or knowledge, or even knowledge of the risk."). However, as long as the
defense exists, one can imagine the defendant invoking the defense here. Certainly the
proposed amendments to the Model Penal Code provisions on sexual assault contemplate
that defendants will be entitled to make the defense. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE:
SEXUAL ASSAULT AND RELATED OFFENSES (AM. LAW INST., Discussion Draft No. 2,
2015) (maintaining the requirement that the defendant at least be reckless to be guilty of
forcible rape (Section 213.1) or sexual penetration against her will or without consent
(Section 213.2)).
247 See Kevin Roose, "Netflix and Chill": The Complete History of a Viral Sex Catch-
phrase, FUSION.NET (Aug. 27, 2015, 6:46 PM), http://fusion.net/story/190020/netflix-and-
chill/ [https://perma.cc/6PPB-32HV]; see also Netflix and Chill, URBAN DicTIONARY,
http://www.urbandictionary.com/define.php?term=netflix%20and%20chill [https://per
ma.cc/G8MK-QAH-E] ("It means that you are going to go over to your partners [sic]
house and fuck with Netflix in the background").
248 See Cover, supra note 8, at 1607.
249 609 A.2d 1338 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992).
250 44 M.J. 174 (C.A.A.F. 1996).
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vicemen she met at the military base's Non-Commissioned Officers Club
(the "NCO Club") back to her apartment for sex, took the woman on a date
at the NCO Club, then escorted her back to her room and assumed, given the
circumstances and statements he had heard about the woman, that she had
non-verbally communicated her consent. Let us assume he too is arrested
and claims that he mistakenly, but reasonably, thought consent existed.
Lastly, consider a variation of United States v. Knox, 2 51 which involved
both verbal and non-verbal communication. The defendant Knox was drink-
ing with his close friend Sergeant Castonguay and Castonguay's girlfriend
when the three decided to return to Knox's room, where the girlfriend sat on
Castonguay's lap while Knox occasionally made attempts to run his hands
along her leg. 2 5 2 Later, Knox stepped out of the room, and when he returned,
he saw that Castonguay had carried his girlfriend to the bed and initiated
sex.25 3 Knox had previously heard that the girlfriend "liked to party," was
sexually adventurous, had once taken her top off at a downtown bar, and had
engaged in various sex acts in the presence of others at a beach party. 254
Suppose Sergeant Castonguay motioned to Knox to join in, that his girl-
friend was open to a threesome. Given the totality of the circumstances and
what he had heard, Knox at trial claims that he (like Berkowitz and Sanchez)
assumed he had consent, especially since the girlfriend seemed to enjoy the
sex.
Not one of these examples is an easy case. Not one of these cases
presents a defendant who would ever be categorized as a Boy Scout or chiv-
alrous knight in shining armor. But whether these defendants should be
found guilty beyond a reasonable doubt is a separate matter. In the real
world, rape cases are rarely simple, rarely black and white. There are rarely
third-party witnesses in rape prosecutions to testify about the alleged sexual
assault itself. In sexual assault cases that do not involve "extra" violence,
there is rarely forensic evidence to compel a finding of guilty or not guilty.
Rather, at the crucial moments, jurors are quite literally left with "she said,
he said." This difficulty is compounded in the category of cases described
above, mistake of fact cases, where we, as a society, recognize that there
is sometimes a rape without a culpable rapist.255 These mistake of fact
cases do not involve a stranger jumping out of the bushes with a knife, but
rather an acquaintance who, instead of brandishing a weapon, has been
privy to conversations with and about the complainant. Indeed, consistent
with evidence that men and women may "read" the same signals differ-
251 United States v. Knox, No. ACM 28628, 1992 WL 97157 (A.F.C.M.R. Apr. 20,
1992).2 5 2 Id. at *1L
253 Id.
254 Id. at *5.
255 See, e.g., Catharine A. MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method, and the State:
Toward Feminist Jurisprudence, 8 SIGNs 635, 654 (1983) (recognizing that there may be
situations where a "woman is raped but not by a rapist").
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ently, 25 6 these mistake of fact cases may even involve crossed signals and
crossed messages. The community to which someone belongs may even im-
pact how one interprets a signal.2 57 A complainant, following a date, alleges
that she never consented to sex. The accused claims that, given the signals,
he honestly and reasonably believed that the sexual contact was consensual.
Against this backdrop, jurors must now make findings based on their assess-
ments of the demeanor of the defendant and complainant and, as discussed
in Part H, how well their stories fit in with preconceived "rape scripts." The
jurors will look for narratives that make sense, so much so that "what hap-
pened" may become indistinguishable from "what must have happened."
Here is the rub. Further compounding the difficulty in these cases is the
way courts cull the evidence. For many courts, the defendant in each of these
cases described above would be prohibited from repeating at trial the state-
ments he heard, notwithstanding the fact that these statements would be of-
fered not for the truth, but to support a reasonable mistake of fact defense.
The jury would never learn that Berkowitz based his understanding in part
on what he heard the complainant say about what she liked in penis size. The
jury would never learn that Sanchez based his understanding on what he
heard about the complainant inviting men she met at the NCO Club to escort
her home to signal she was interested in sex. The jury would never learn that
Knox based his understanding in part on what he'd heard about the com-
plainant being sexually adventurous and open to threesomes. In short, the
courts would deem the statements as touching on the complainant's sexual
history or predisposition and thus presumptively barred under rape shield
rule. Instead of hearing a story "with descriptive richness," and the "persua-
sive power of the concrete and particular," 25 8 the jury would be left with a
story with troubling gaps and elisions. Allow me to make this point differ-
ently. Excluding these out of court statements may protect real victims from
embarrassment and shame, but it does so at a cost. These same rules, as
currently applied, frustrate jurors' ability to tell whether the defendant is, in
256 David Dryden Henningsen, Flirting with Meaning: An Examination of Miscom-
munication in Flirting Interactions, 50 SEx ROLES 481, 487-88 (2004); Antonia Abbey
& Christian Melby, The Effects of Nonverbal Cues on Gender Differences in Perceptions
of Sexual Intent, 15 SEx ROLES 283, 295-96 (1986); Michelle Anderson, Negotiating Sex,
78 S. CALIF. L. REV. 1401, 1417 (2005).
1 Consider a woman who can't find the key to her apartment one evening and asks a
male neighbor if she can sleep on his couch until the morning. For the male neighbor who
grew up in a more progressive, sex-equality based community, that the woman asked to
sleep on his couch may mean simply that. By contrast, for the male neighbor who grew
up in a more traditional community, the woman's suggestion may come across as a coded
invitation, especially if he's wondering why she didn't ask any of the female neighbors in
the building. Although Dan Kahan has focused on the cultural background of jurors in
rape cases, his analysis seems applicable here. See Kahan, supra note 95, at 793-97. On
reception theory, see generally STANLEY FISH, Is THERE A TEXT IN THIS CLASS?: THE
AUTHORITY OF INTERPRETIVE COMMUNITIES (1980) (exploring how the communities to
which one belongs and interacts can affect how one interprets a text).
258 See supra note 56.
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fact, a real rapist. He may be a cad, a dog, an idiot, even a complete dick.
But the law should require something more before we label someone a con-
victed rapist. For those of us who care about justice for real victims and care
about punishment for real rapists, the current rules are too protective and
maternalistic in situations where a complainant's sexual predisposition or
history is not really at issue.
What I am suggesting is something better, and that trusts jurors' ability
to decide the facts of the case.25 9 Recall again the cases described above,
loosely based on the facts of Commonwealth v. Berkowitz, United States v.
Sanchez, and United States v. Knox. In each of these cases, we can imagine
the defendant seeking to offer at trial an out of court statement that he heard
in order to explain why he thought, however mistakenly, that consent ex-
isted. In each of these cases, the proffered statements would clearly be rele-
vant-indeed, they would be crucial to each defendant's theory of the case.
In each of these cases, the true import of the proffered statements would lie
not in their truth, the test for inadmissible hearsay, but in their effect on the
defendant. Thus, relevancy rules and hearsay rules would favor admissibil-
ity. Since such evidence would not be offered "to prove a claim" that a
complainant engaged in sexual behavior or had a sexual predisposition, my
proposed rape shield rule would not bar their admission. Rather, the question
of their admissibility would turn on weighing their probative value against
the risk of unfair prejudice. In some cases, the prejudice might be too great,
and trial courts would bar admission. In other cases, however, balancing
might compel admission in light of a court's other gatekeeping tools, espe-
cially since in truly non-truth cases, there is little risk of embarrassment or
the harassment that rape shield rules were designed to avoid. Again, one
could imagine a trial court conditioning admission of these statements on a
concession from the defendant about his having no basis for their truth. One
can imagine jury instructions that make it patently clear that jurors must not
consider the substance of the statements as true.
Applying this modified rape shield rule so that it only bars sexual his-
tory or predisposition evidence offered for the truth will not solve every
problem I've identified with rape shields. But it will get us closer to episte-
mic comfort with the judgments jurors reach, whether they be judgments of
guilt or not guilt. We might still disagree with certain outcomes, but it would
not be because jurors were blindfolded. Rather, we would at least know that
the jurors heard necessary evidence where the probative value was not out-
weighed by a substantial risk of unfair prejudice, and in doing so had the
" Part of my trust in jurors is attributable to how different society is from when rape
shields were enacted in the late 1970s. As I have written previously, "we have come a
long way." Capers, Real Women, Real Rape, supra note 14, at 876. As just one example,
In 1977, 73% of surveyed Americans believed that extramarital sex was always wrong,
and another 13.6% believed it was almost always wrong. Norval D. Glenn & Charles N.
Weaver, Attitudes Toward Premarital, Extramarital, and Homosexual Relations in the
U.S. in the 1970s, 15 J. SEX REs. 108, 113 (1979). We have come a long way indeed.
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ability to reach a verdict crucial to "community acceptance" and
validation. 2 60
Indeed, let me take this a step further: such a rule would give us addi-
tional comfort in those cases in which a jury reaches a verdict of guilty.
After all, a jury hearing the omitted out-of-court statements in Stephens v.
Miller could easily conclude that Stephens, who suborned perjury, 26 1 is a liar
and a rapist, and return a verdict of guilty. A jury hearing Berkowtiz's claim
that the complainant talked about her preferred penis size in his presence
could conclude that Berkowitz was credible, but determine that what he
heard could not possibly lead him to reasonably believe she was consenting
to sex with him, and find him guilty. Similarly, a jury, after hearing Knox's
defense that he heard his best friend's girlfriend "liked to party" and was
sexually adventurous, could easily conclude that it still was not reasonable
for him to think what he heard from third parties amounted to consent from
her. This, too, is what I mean about better rape judgments.
CONCLUSION
The goal of this Article has been to address a recurring problem with
rape shields and move us closer to what the law ought. In time, I hope that
even this fix may be unnecessary. A decade ago, when I first started thinking
about rape law, it was the culture of rape that seemed most problematic. But
if there is a rape culture, it is certainly not static. We have certainly come a
long way. Thankfully, these days, when a norm of needing affirmative con-
sent is gaining traction, the idea of reasonable mistake-based on what
someone else said, how the complainant was dressed, how the complainant
danced (was she twerking?), whether the complainant was drinking, whether
the complainant supposedly said it "with a song,"2 62 or whether the com-
plainant occasionally liked S&M2 6 3 or had a copy of 50 Shades of Grey-
may seem a relic of the past. One can only hope. Until then, some interven-
tion is appropriate. Hopefully, my intervention is a welcome start.
20 WHITE, supra note 136, at 185.
261 Stephens v. Miller, 13 F.3d 998, 1002 (7th Cir. 1994) (en banc).
262 This is a reference to an ad on Spotify, which encourages people to communicate
"with a song." Interestingly, the tone of the advertisement suggests that a song can com-
municate interest in engaging in sex. See Spotify, Can't Find the Words?, YouTUBE (Apr.
10, 2014), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YnNhFVf2ULo [https://perma.cc/HZM
5-K6ED].
263 In People v. Jovanovic, the defendant apparently thought he had consent when the
complainant described herself as someone who enjoyed sadomasochistic sex and being a
"slave." 700 N.Y.S.2d 156, 169 (N.Y. App. Div. 1999).
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